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NOTES
New Approaches By the FPC to the
Regulation of Natural Gas Producers:
an Evaluation
Since 1954 the independent producers of natural gas have been reg-
ulated by the Federal Power Commission, operating under the Natural
Gas Act' as construed by the Supreme Court in the Phillips case.2 The
results of this regulatory activity have been frustration and delay.
3
Recently the Commission has taken steps to relieve some of its miseries.
It has instituted a new approach to producer regulation, area pricing,
and it has by regulation outlawed the use of certain contract pro-
visions, indefinite price adjustment clauses, deemed especially harmful
to the public interest.
The probable practicality and legality of the area pricing plan have
been discussed elsewhere.4 However, little attention has been given in
legal literature to the important question of whether this approach is
appropriate to the underlying economic problems involved in the na-
tion's utilization of its natural gas resources. It is the purpose of this
note to examine the economic consequences of both area pricing and
the abolition of indefinite price adjustment clauses, drawing on the
results of recent scholarship in the field of economics.
I. Tim NATURAL GAS INDUsTRY
"Natural gas" is a mixture of light hydrocarbons which exist in a
gaseous state at atmospheric pressure.5 It is found, either alone or in
association with oil, in underground reservoirs, or "traps" (layers of
porous gas-bearing rock sealed off by layers of nonporous rock).6
Commonly a number of reservoirs are found in the same general vicini-
1. 52 Stat. 821 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-17w (1958).
2. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
3. For example, at the end of calendar year 1959 there were 3065 producer rate
increase suspensions pending, involving 154 million dollars annually; in 1958 the figures
were 2034 suspensions and 89 million dollars; in 1957, 1040 suspensions and 50 million
dollars. 1960 PROCEEDINGS OF ABA SECTION OF MINERAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES
LAW 50.
4. E.g., Orn, Area Pricing of Natural Gas by the Federal Power Commission, in
OIL AND GAS OPERATIONs: LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS IN THE TIDELANDS AND ON LAND
371 (Slovenko ed. 1963) [hereinafter cited as OIL AND GAS OPERATIONS]; Note, FPC
Regulation of Independent Producers of Natural Gas, 75 Haiv. L. REV. 549 (1962).
The second of these is especially valuable.
5. STocKToN, HENSHAW & GRAVES, ECONOMiCS OF NATURAL GAS IN TMXAs 10-12
(1952) [hereinafter cited as EcoNoMIcs OF NATURAL GAS].
6. Id. at 5-8.
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ty, constituting a "field." A valuable raw material for industrial chemi-
cal processes, 7 natural gas is chiefly important as a fuel.8 Clean-burn-
ing, easily ignited, and readily controlled thermostatically, it is
desirable for industrial as well as domestic and commercial fuel pur-
poses.9 Its optimal social use is thought to be in the home-for space
heating, water heating, cooking, and refrigerating. 10
Every oil well contains natural gas, either dissolved in the oil or
lying in a distinct layer above it in the reservoir ("associated gas").11
The high pressure of gas in a reservoir is used to drive oil to the sur-
face. Thus, whenever oil is produced, gas is produced as a necessary
by-product. 12 Such by-product gas is known as "casinghead gas." The
increased demand for natural gas since World War II has led to the
exploitation of reservoirs containing only gas;13 such gas is called "dry"
or "non-associated" gas.
Natural gas was first produced commercially in the United States
during the latter part of the nineteenth century in the Appalachian
regions of Pennsylvania and New York.14 By the end of World War I
the supply in this area had begun to fail. However, in 1925, incidental
to the search for oil, immense reserves of gas were discovered in the
southwestern United States.'5 To finance the construction of costly
transmission lines powerful holding companies were formed.16 These
companies developed vertically integrated gas systems, which engaged
in production, transportation, and distribution of natural gas.
In the early days of the industry in the Southwest gas was a glut
on the market.' The integrated gas systems could supply most of their
7. In the past the principal use has been in the manufacture of carbon black. See
id. at 27-35. In recent years, however, the growth of the synthetic chemical industry
has opened up thousands of new uses. Id. at 66-85.
8. "It is very generally recognized that the fuel with the best performance char-
acteristic is a clean, dry gas of uniform and stable composition. If the common
specifications of utilization-cleanliness, freedom from impurities, concentrated heating
value, susceptibility to temperature control, completeness of combustion, efficiency, ease
of handling, and uniformity-are considered, it is obvious that natural gas has marked
physical advantages over competing fuels." Id. at 254.
9. In industrial uses natural gas is a preferred fuel in many metallurgical and
ceramic heating operations. It is also used to develop steam and electricity. Id. at 13.
10. FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 634-35 (1944) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting).
11. EcoONocs OF NATURAL GAS 5.
12. Id. at 8.
13. Such gas comprises the bulk of total United States reserves. EcoNoNcs OF
NATURAL GAS 5.
14. FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., supra note 10, at 632-33 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
15. Hardwicke, Some Consequences of Fears by Independent Producers of Gas of
Federal Regulation, 19 LAw & CoNTEmp. PRon. 342, 348 (1954).
16. Atkinson, Federal Regulation of Natural Gas-The Independent Producers' Status,
13 Sw. L.J. 425, 426 (1959). See also BLACrLY & OATM AN, NATURAL GAS IN THE
PUBLIC INTEREST 55-56 (1947).
17. In 1940 the average field price for gas was only 4.5 cents per mcf. McKm, THE
REGULATION OF NATURAL GAS 12 (1957) [hereinafter cited as McKiE].
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needs from their own reserves. Furthermore, as a result of the rapid
growth of the oil industry large amounts of casinghead gas were pro-
duced. Owners of non-associated gas reserves were forced to sell to
the integrated systems at very low prices under long-term contracts.
18
Around 1935, consumers began to complain of exploitation by the pipe-
lines; as a result the Federal Trade Commission conducted an investi-
gation into the natural gas industry. The FTC's 1936 report to Con-
gress 19 included proposals for legislation regulating the sale of gas in
interstate commerce. 20 The Natural Gas Act was passed without
opposition in 1938.
After World War II the gas industry went into a period of unusual
growth.2 ' Advances in technology made long-distance high-pressure
transmission lines feasible, and extensive pipeline construction took
place. Early in this period the ratemaking practices of the Federal
Power Commission (which had been charged with the administration
of the Natural Gas Act) made it relatively unprofitable for regulated
pipelines to own gas production facilities.22 Thus the independent
natural gas producer became a major force in the industry.23
At the present day the natural gas industry has three fairly distinct
branches: production, transmission, and distribution. Most gas pro-
duction is in the hands of independent producers who sell to inter-
state pipelines.2 Because of the great cost of pipeline construction,
usually financed through long-term bonded indebtedness,25 and be-
cause of the gas consumer's need to be assured of a continuous supply
of gas for a considerable period,26 gas is purchased under long-term
contracts (usually twenty years).
The long term of the gas sale contract has led to problems. The
producer, anxious to be able to share in any future increases in the
general price level of gas, hesitates to commit himself for twenty
years at what may later appear to be too low a pricey.2  To meet this
18. The usual term of the gas sale contract is fifteen to twenty years. MACAVOY,
PnacE FORmATiON IN NATURAL GAs FiELDs 30 (1962) [hereinafter cited as MAcAvoy].
19. S. Doc. No. 92, pt. 84-A, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936).
20. Id. at 616.
21. Hardwicke, supra note 15, at 349. A big factor in sparking this growth was tho
conversion of the Big Inch and Little Inch pipelines for the carrying of natural gas.
Ibid.
22. Note, 75 HARv. L. REv. 549, 550 (1962). The particular practice involved was
the application of rate base regulation to producing properties owned by pipelines.
See note 118 infra and accompanying text.
23. In 1962, 90.6 per cent of the nation's supply of natural gas was produced by
independent producers. PuB. Urm. FoRT., Oct. 10, 1963, p. 80.
24. See note 23 supra. Many independent producers sell to intrastate pipelines also.
25. Note, 75 HAnV. L. REv. 549, 550 (1962).
26. To protect consumers, the FFC will not certify sales for a term of less than
twenty years. Ibid.
27. This is especially so in light of the experience of many producers who sold
during the early days of the industry in the Southwest
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problem, price adjustment clauses have been used in most recent con-
tracts. These clauses are of two kinds, definite and indefinite. A defi-
nite price adjustment clause provides for increases in the contract
price of stated amounts at stated intervals. Use of such a clause rep-
resents an attempt by the producer to predict market behavior over
the next twenty years. 28 Indefinite price adjustment clauses, on the
other hand, provide for price increases keyed in both timing and
amount to current market behavior. The following types of indefinite
pricing provisions are in common usage: 29 (1) two-party favored na-
tion clauses-automatic increase of the contract price to match any
price the buyer (the pipeline) pays at any time in the future for gas
bought in the same area; (2) third-party favored nation clauses-auto-
matic increase of the contract price to match any price paid at any
time in the future by any buyer purchasing gas in the same area; (3)
renegotiation clauses-provision for renegotiation (often with arbitra-
tion provisions) of the contract price at certain fixed or determinable
times; (4) spiral escalation clauses-automatic increase of contract
price whenever the buyer gets an increased price for its resale of the
gas; and (5) price index clauses-automatic increase of contract price
in response to increases in overall price index.
When a pipeline carries its full operating load of gas, the fixed costs
of pipeline operation are spread over the largest possible number of
units.30 When the line carries less than a full load, the unit cost of gas
rises. The domestic demand, consisting in large part of requirements
for space heating, varies widely from season to season. To take up the
slack during the off-season of domestic usage, the practice of inter-
ruptible industrial sale has been developed. Gas is sold at a low cost
for certain industrial uses, on the condition that the flow may be cut
off from those uses when the gas is needed to satisfy domestic con-
sumer demand.31
II. ECONOMICS OF TBm NATuRAL GAS INDuSTRY
During the 1930's, in the early days of the industry in the South-
west,32 prices dropped to an unbelievably low level.33 This was due to
a number of factors: unavailability of transmission facilities; produc-
tion of vast amounts of casinghead gas; existence of integrated gas
28. McKiE 35.
29. COENBOO, CONM'rITIoN IN THE FnmD MARKET FOR NATURAL GAS 110-12 (Rice
Institute Pamphlet vol. 44, No. 4, 1958) [hereinafter cited as Coxcoo].
30. ECONOMICS OF NATURAL GAS 177-81.
31. Id. at 175-76.
32. See text accompanying notes 14-23 supra.
33. See note 17 supra.
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systems;34 monopoly position of the few pipelines.35 After World War
II, mushrooming consumer demand3 6 caused prices to skyrocket up-
wards.37 This price rise had two principal results. First, it alarmed
consumer groups and caused them to take vigorous action to check
further increases. Second, it made producers wary of contracting on a
long-term basis without making some provision for increased prices
as the market continued to rise.38 The growth of the natural gas in-
dustry, and the vagaries of federal regulation thereof, must always be
read in the light of this price history.
A. Concentration
When an industry is competitive, its regulation may lead to unde-
sirable results.3 9 If prices are set artificially low, the demand for what
is being sold will outreach supply, and some sort of rationing scheme
must be devised. When prices are set artificially high, over-production
will result. On the other hand, in the absence of regulation, competi-
tion will in the short run set prices at the point of equality between
the supply of and the demand for the product.40 Over the long run,
an industry in which a competitive market exists will attract capital,
given increase in consumer demand and increase in profit margins.
Almost no market is perfectly competitive. However, a market
price mechanism will perform its function of allocating the limited
supply of goods among consumers in a socially desirable fashion so
long as a state of "workable competition" is present.41 This necessi-
tates the satisfaction of a number of conditions :42 (1) The market must
consist of a large number of sellers. (2) No one seller or buyer may
be so large as to dominate the industry. (3) Entry into the market
must be relatively easy so that existing firms face not only actual com-
petition from their own ranks but also the threat of potential new
competition should prices rise to such an extent that abnormal profits
are earned. (4) The several firms in the industry must operate inde-
34. The integrated systems could supply most of their demands from their own
supplies; thus the market for natural gas was quite restricted.
35. See note 68 infra and accompanying text.
36. Between 1952 and 1962 the number of domestic consumers rose from 23.9
million to 31.9 million. PuB. U=n-. FORT., June 20, 1963, p. 46.
37. In 1950 the average wellhead price of gas was 6.5 cents per mcf (thousand
cubic feet); in 1961 it was 15.1 cents. PB. UTm. FORT., Oct. 10, 1963, p. 80.
38. Hence the widespread use of indefinite pricing provisions. See notes 27-29
supra and accompanying text.
39. "Should other than economic considerations prevail and a competitive industry
be regulated . . . [most] economists . . . would warn us of the inevitable economic
price which must be paid." COKENBoo 2.
40. SAmusaEsoN, ECONOmicS 380 (4th ed. 1958).
41. CoxENnoo 11. See SAmUELSON, op. cit. supra note 40, at 486-90, for a discussion
of the "evils" of imperfect competition.
42. Ibid.
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pendently of each other with neither tacit nor overt collusion. (5)
There must be some knowledge to buyers and sellers of market prices
for a number of transactions. Of these conditions, the first two are
considered most important.43 Where there are many alternative
sources of supply with no firm dominant, competitive performance
can be expected to exist. The number of alternative sources of supply,
and their relative size, is studied by economists through the use of the
concept of "concentration."44 The percentage of the industry account-
ed for by the top four, or eight, or twenty, firms is computed and
examined; the lower the percentage figures the less "concentrated" the
industry is.
Recent economic studies have confirmed older findings that the
concentration of the natural gas production industry is quite low-
lower, in fact, than about three-quarters of manufacturing industries
in the United States.45 One author presents the following table of the
percentage of natural gas sales to interstate pipelines:46
Sales under Sales under contracts
all contracts executed 1951-1955
Top 4 firms 23% 20%
" 8 35% 33%
" 12 " 44% 41%
" 16 " 49% 48%
" 20 " 54% 53%
Similar figures resulted when examination was restricted to sales in a
single producing area, and the percentages were only slightly higher
when consideration was narrowed to sales to the top fifteen buyers
within a single area.47 The author of that study concludes:
43. Ibid.
44. Id. at 41.
45. COKENBoo 79.
46. Id. at 62.
47. When consideration was restricted to sales in the Gulf Coast area, the figures
were:
All contract dates 1951-1955 contracts
Top 4 firms 26% 27%
8 " 42% 42%
12 " 52% 53%
16 " 60% 61%
20 " 67% 67%
Ibid. And restricting consideration to sales to the top fifteen buyers in the Gulf Coast
region, the results were:
1946-1950 contracts 1951-1955 contracts
Top 4 firms 34% 27%
To 8 " 53% 42%
" 12 " 65% 53%
" 16 " 73% 61%




The field market for natural gas is one of low concentration. No one firm
is large relative to the market, and none is considerably larger than its
competitors.... The leading firms change from time to time. Concentration
has decreased since World War II. And the future market will probably
be widely distributed among the various sellers. 48
Most economists agree that the natural gas industry is one of ex-
tremely low concentration. 49 Furthermore, entry into the market is
relatively easy.50 The average initial fixed cost for a productive gas
well is about 181,000 dollars. Moreover, "ease of entry has been shown
directly in the changing names and positions of the leading sellers in
the concentration tables for different time periods."51
Economists have for some time, relying on concentration figures,
insisted that the price of natural gas in the field is set competitively.5 2
However, consumer groups have argued that special features of the
gas industry result in non-competitive behavior in spite of low concen-
tration.53 In light of recent economic analysis, these arguments seem
highly questionable.
(1) The "garden-hose" argument.5 A pipeline, it is said, is not
movable like a garden hose. Thus, once it is built it is at the mercy
of the producers whose properties it touches. This argument ignores
the fact that the bulk of the supplies for a line are contracted on a
twenty-year basis before construction is begun (otherwise neither
financing nor Commission approval would be available). 5 In addi-
tion, this argument assumes that supplies bought after the line is laid
are bought under monopolistic conditions. But this would be true only
if the line is unable to achieve connection with more than a few sell-
ers-which is almost never the case5 --or if there is collusion among
many sellers-which is possible, but has never been suggested.
(2) "Fixed supply."57 The theory behind this argument is that addi-
tions to gas reserves are a by-product of drilling for oil, and so unre-
lated to the price of gas. Thus, it is thought, price increases will not
bring increased output, only abnormal profits. Such a suggestion is a
48. Id. at 121.
49. ADELmAN, TAE SUPPLY AND PRICE OF NAorumAL GAS 39 (1962) [hereinafter cited
as ADELmANI; McKjE 29; Boatwright, Reasonable Market Prices, in 1957 PnocEEDiu's
OF ABA SECTION OF MINERAL AND NATuRAL. REsoJcEs LAw 4.
50. Coirnoo 121.
51. Ibid.
52. "There is ... no question but that the field price of gas in the United States is
competitively determined." ADELMAN 39.
53. See, e.g., Douglas, The Case for the Consumer of Natural Gas, 44 GEo. L.J. 568
(1956).
54. COKENBOO 42.




contradiction- of the economic theory of joint products.58 More sig-
nificantly, available data indicates that, with ever higher percentages
of gas reserves being found in the non-associated form, the price of gas
is determinative of supply.59
(3) The "captive consumer."60 This argument is that once a con-
sumer installs gas equipment he is a "captive" of the producers. That
is, he will more readily pay increases in the price of gas than he will
junk his gas appliances and buy new ones using a different fuel. But
the so-called "captive consumer" is not at all an unusual situation.
The driver of a car is a "captive" of the gasoline manufacturers-he
must buy gasoline. More analogously, the owner of a home with wood
siding is a "captive" of the paint producers. He will surely pay a
higher price for paint more readily than he will change his home, or
put up brick facing. What is important, however, is whether or not
the industry is monopolistic-i.e., whether there are a number of com-
peting sellers who will, motivated by the desire for profit, keep prices
down.
(4) Soft bargaining.61 The criticism here is that the principal inter-
state buyers do not bargain vigorously, since whatever they pay for
gas goes into their cost of service when their rates are set by the FPC.
Although the merit of such a charge is difficult to determine, there are
several factors making it difficult to believe: 62 (a) Some pipelines deal
directly in the ultimate market in unregulated direct sales. (b) Even
a small price increase-may affect the pipeline's overall profits. (c) The
pipelines have a bargaining advantage in most areas.
63
(5) Abnormal profits.6 It is suggested that profits are abnormally
high in the natural gas industry. It has been shown that this charge
is not justified. The average rate of return on the investment in a suc-
cessful well is twelve per cent.65 A survey by Fortune magazine in
1956 showed that the nation's five hundred largest industrial concerns
earned, on the average, a fourteen per cent return on net worth.
66
58. Whenever one product cannot be produced without at the same time producing
the other the two are called joint products. ADELmAN 25. The total revenue for the
two products determines total activity, and gas revenues are not an insignificant part
of the total. Thus it is incorrect to assert that gas prices do not affect the supply of
gas. CoKENuoo 84-85. But see ADELmAN 29., 30 ("[W]e would not expect, and do
not find, any perceptible relation between the price of gas and the discoveries of
'casinghead' gas.").
59. ADELmAN 60; CoxENnoo 89.
60. Id. at 93-96.
61. Id. at 96-101,
62. Ibid.; Lindahl, Federal Regulation of Natural Gas Producers and Gatherers, 46
Am. ECON. REv. 532 (May, 1956).
63. See notes 78-81 infra and accompanying text.
64. Coxu moo 103-10.
65. Id. at 108.
66. Fortune, July 1956, p. 88.
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Working from studies of concentration, researchers have constructed
an economic history of natural gas production in the southwestern
United States. 67 In early years there was a buyers' monopoly ("monop-
sony"), due to (1) the unpredictable nature of discovery, such that
deposits would be found beyond the reach of existing pipelines, and
(2) substantial economies of scale in pipeline transmission. Even to-
day, "as a gas area opens, the first pipeline to begin building will, at
least for some time and perhaps permanently, be the only buyer."6 8
However, as an area develops, monopsony tends to give way.6 9 One
indication of the giving way of monopsony is a sharp upward bounce
of price. This price bounce, actually indicative of the advent of com-
petition, has been seized upon by consumer groups as evidence of
monopoly. According to one analyst: "It is characteristic of the topsy-
turveydom of some present-day thinking in the United States that this
price bounce is viewed as a sign of a sellers' monopoly. In fact it
signals the deterioration of a buyers' monopoly. If there is any price
bounce left in an area, there is still some monopsony.
" 70
B. Pricing
A recent study7' has corroborated the earlier findings of the concen-
tration studies that prices are set competitively in the field market for
natural gas.72 In this study the author does not examine concentration
or other indicia of the structure of the market. Instead, he compares
the pattern of purchase prices with theoretical models based on com-
petitive, monopolistic, and monopsonistic markets. When there is
competition, "price levels should be uniform for all purchasers. There
should be distinct price variation with contract volume, the location
of the trap, and the term-length of production. . ... 73 Under monop-
olistic or monopsonistic market conditions there should be variation
from this pattern.74
67. ADELmA 44-47; CoxENnoo 67-72; McKiE 28-29.
68. ADELMAN 45.
69. This is evidenced by two effects. First, oil companies report to shareholders that
they are moving into an area "inadequately served." Second, there is a sharp upward
bounce of prices when a new line enters. Id. at 45-46.
70. Id. at 46.
71. MAcAvoY.
72. "The general conclusions of this economic analysis . . . are that field markets
in the 1950s were centers of highly competitive pricing, or were characterized generally
by movement away from monopsony (buyer's monopoly) toward competition." Id. at
vii.
73. Id. at 82.
74. "When there is such concentrated ownership of uncommitted reserves that a
producer has monopoly power, prices should be set individually for each purchaser.
Higher prices should be paid for all new reserves by pipelines with the more inelastic
field demands. This should disrupt any variation in prices according to conditions of
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For purposes of analysis, the nation's gas supplies are arranged in
three groupings: "Gulf Coast"75 "Mid-Continent,"76 and "West Texas-
New Mexico." 77 In the West Texas-New Mexico market in the 1950's
the prevailing structure was one of monopsony (buyer's monopoly),
and in general prices were lower than might have been expected had
the market been competitive.78 In the Gulf Coast market competition
emerged from a prior condition of monopsony during the period be-
tween 1950 and 1954, and systematic competition prevailed from 1955
to 1960.79 The Mid-Continent region showed, from a pricing view-
point, both competitive and monopsonistic behavior.80 The author
concludes:
Price formation in the West Texas, Gulf Coast, and Mid-Continent regions
would seem to have followed at times from monopsony, at times from com-
petition, in the sale of new reserves. Monopsony prevailed in each of the
three producing regions at some time, but pricing was generally becoming
more competitive in the late 1950's.81
C. Indefinite Pricing Provisions
Indefinite pricing clauses82 are not unknown in other industries.83
In the natural gas industry, they have probably served to bring buyers
and sellers together during times of uncertainty as to market be-
havior.8 Their purpose is, in general terms, to shift the risk of future
market increases from the producer to the pipeline and ultimately to
the consumer; thus the consumer groups have opposed their use. The
real evil is the long term of the gas sale contract, necessitated by con-
siderations of financing and public protection.85 Definite price adjust-
ment clauses help to alleviate the problems caused by the long-term
field locations, the volume of uncommitted reserves, or some other aspect of a
particular type of contract." Ibid. "When there is one buyer in the relevant region,
monopsony prices should be set lower than the competitive level and should exhibit
little or no variation from contract to contract .... Actual prices should be so uniform
as to indicate a lack of a pattern similar to that expected from competition." Id.
at 82-83.
75. This includes Louisiana, adjacent areas of Texas, and the region along the
Texas Gulf Coast. Id. at 93-94.
76. Oklahoma, Kansas, and north Texas, including the Panhandle and Hugoton
fields. Ibid.
77. This includes two basins, the Permian Basin in southwestern Texas and south-
eastern New Mexico, and the San Juan Basin, in northwestern New Mexico and
southwestern Colorado. Ibid.
78. Id. at 121, 126-27, 145.
79. Id. at 186, 210-11.
80. Id. at 212.
81. Id. at 243.
82. See notes 27-29 supra and accompanying text for discussion of indefinite pricing
clauses.
83. ADELMAN 42-43.




contract, and are probably unobjectionable to consumers, 6 but pro-
ducers have not been willing to settle for them. 7
There is disagreement among economists as to both effect and de-
sirability of indefinite pricing provisions.8 There seems to be agree-
ment, however, that insofar as such clauses are one-way streets, i.e.,
provide for price increases but not for price reductions, they are de-
fective.89 There is also agreement that certain types of clauses-spiral,
third-party favored nation, and price index-are not justifiable. The
index of prices generally is an extraneous consideration in the pricing
of a commodity.90 Likewise, that a pipeline has received a higher
price for the gas it sells should not enter into the pricing of the gas it
buys-at least, not automatically under a contract provision.91 Finally,
under the third-party favored nation clause the purchaser loses con-
trol of the price he pays for gas. The price is not a price he has "bar-
gained" for.92 One imprudent small purchase by a buyer in a hurry
can trigger price increases under such a clause for all pipelines buying
in the area.9
3
Contrariwise, it has been suggested that renegotiation and two-party
favored nation clauses tend to minimize noncompetitive aspects of
natural gas pricing.94 Furthermore, it has been pointed out that in the
absence of such provisions the average price for pipeline gas would be
kept abnormally low, thus continuing to call forth excessive demand.9
In any case, it seems fairly clear now that the inclusion of such a
86. At least, consumers have not yet raised any objections to them. And it is
difficult to see how there could be any objection. The buyer under such a clause knows
exactly what price he will have to pay over the life of the contract.
87. Largely because of their earlier bitter experience with the unforeseeable boom
in the natural gas industry. See note 38 supra and accompanying text.
88. As to effect, compare ADnmusrs 43 ("To the extent-and it may have been
substantial-that contingent clauses for a time held prices below the market level . . .
they must be regarded as unfortunate."), with MAcAvoY 264 (stating that initial prices
for contracts with contingent clauses showed no tendency to be lower than those in
contracts without such clauses). As to desirability, compare ADELMAN 43 and MAC-
AvoY 265, with CoxxrBoo 117 ("The tendency toward price uniformity created by the
indefinite pricing clauses is, therefore, not only in the direction of competitive pricing
... it should also achieve more or less competitive price levels, unless there should be
considerable defects in the wording of the clauses.")
89. E.g., CoxnNBoo 117; Lindahl, supra note 62, at 542. In a falling market the
pricing will be non-competitive, since prices will be pegged at the highest point reached.
90. Lindahi, supra note 62, at 542. The market for gas should determine the price,
not the market for other commodities.
91. McKrE 38; Lindahl, supra note 62, at 542. A higher resale price, based perhaps
on higher transport cost, is another extraneous factor.
92. Lindahl, supra note 62, at 542. "Where price adjustments depend on prices
agreed to by outside parties . . . new price bargains are arrived at without any actual
bargaining .. " Ibid.
93. McKsu 37; CoxENBoo 113.
94. Cox wBoo 117; see note 88 supra.
95. "If demand continues to increase, the prices for new supply will continue to be
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clause in a gas sale contract does not cause the original contract price
to be lower than it would have been in the absence of such a pro-
vision.96 Arguing against the use of two-party favored nation clauses,
one author noted that they caused relocation of buyers 7 Older buyers
don't purchase in established areas when new purchases would give
rise to higher prices on their old contracts. "With the clauses
having little 'contingency' value in current markets and resulting in the
economic cost of pipeline relocation, there would seem to be some
advantage from voiding them."98
III. BEGULATON UNDER THE NATURAL GAS AcT
A. The Natural Gas Act
The Natural Gas Act99 is designed to apply to companies engaging
in the "transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce" or in "the
sale in interstate commerce of natural gas for resale for ultimate public
consumption."100 Such companies are defined in the Act to be "natural
gas companies." The Act exempts intrastate transportation and sale,' 0 '
direct sales to consumers, and the production or gathering of gas.
02
The operative provisions of the Natural Gas Act with respect to
price regulation are sections 4, 5, 7, and 16. Section 7103 provides that
no natural gas company shall engage in the sale or transportation of
natural gas subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commis-
sion, or construct facilities therefor, without obtaining first a certificate
of public convenience and necessity from the Commission. Such a cer-
tificate can only be issued after a hearing of which all interested par-
ties are given notice. In issuing a certificate, the Commission may in-
sert any conditions that it deems required by the public convenience
and necessity.104 Section 7 further provides that no natural gas corn-
bid up. If the prices on 'old' supply are arbitrarily kept down to lower levels and the
lower cost is passed through as a lower average price to consumers, then demand will
increase all the more and prices for new supply will go up all the faster, which will
pull up the average price." McKIE 36.
96. MAcAvoY 264. MacAvoy's study is supported by impressive data.
97. Id. at 264-65.
98. Id. at 265.
99. 52 Stat. 821 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-17w (1958).
100. Natural Gas Act § l(b), 52 Stat. 821 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §
717(b) (1958).
101. Natural Gas Act § 1(c), 52 Stat. 821 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 717(c)
(1958).
102. The provisions of the act cover transportation or sale for resale in interstate
commerce, but do "not apply to any other transportation or sale of natural gas or to
the facilities used for such distribution or to the production or gathering of natural
gas." Natural Gas Act § 1(b), 52 Stat. 821 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 717(b)
(1958).
103. Natural Gas Act § 7, 52 Stat. 824 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717f (1958).
104. Including a condition as to price. Atlantic Ref. Co. -v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
360 U.S. 378 (1959).
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pany shall abandon any service subject to Commission jurisdiction
without first obtaining permission from the Commission.
Section 4105 governs changes in rates. Rates and charges that are
not "just and reasonable" 1 6 are declared unlawful, and no change in
rates is allowed except after thirty days' notice to the Commission.
Upon the filing of a new rate schedule, the Commission may, either
upon complaint of an interested party or on its own motion, initiate
an inquiry into the lawfulness of the proposed charges. Pending the
hearing, the Commission may suspend the new schedule for up to five
months. After that time the company may put the new rates into
effect, but the Commission may require the furnishing of a bond to
refund any receipts attributable to an increase later declared to be un-
lawful. At the hearing, of which all interested parties are to be given
notice, the burden of proof on the issue of the justness and reasonable-
ness of the proposed change rests upon the party seeking the change.
Section 5107 has seen little use.108 It empowers the Commission,
acting upon complaint or on its own motion, to inquire whether an
existing rate schedule of a natural gas company is just and reasonable.
If it finds that the schedule is not, the Commission may order the rates
decreased to the "lowest reasonable" level. Section 16109 gives the
Commission power to make and enforce any orders, rules, and regu-
lations which it may find necessary to the performance of its duties
under the Act.
B. Pre-1954 Regulation
Before the momentous Phillips"0 decision in 1954, it was widely
believed that independent producers of natural gas were not reached
by the provisions of the Natural Gas Act."' The Commission waiv-
ered,1 2 but tended to take this view itself." 3 Thus attention during
105. Natural Gas Act § 4, 52 Stat. 822 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717c (1958).
106. The term "just and reasonable" is nowhere defined in the Natural Gas Act.
FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 600-01 (1944). The words are "words
of art in public utility law, carrying a well-defined and accepted meaning," but "do not
necessarily have the same meaning when used in connection with producer prices
.... Or, Area Pricing of Natural Gas by the Federal Power Commission, in OIL
AN GAs OPERAnoNs 371, 372.
107. Natural Gas Act § 5, 52 Stat. 823 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717d (1958).
108. Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FPC, 316 F.2d 677, 678 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
109. Natural Gas Act § 16, 52 Stat. 830 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717o (1958).
110. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
111. See, e.g., Crenshaw, The Regulation of Natural Gas, 19 LAw & CONTE7aIP.
PROB. 325, 338 (1954).
112. See 1949 POCE=Incs OF ABA SE=cON OF MINERAL LAW 71, discussing the
position of the Commission with respect to a bill which would have exempted inde-
pendent producers.
113. See, e.g., Columbian Fuel Corp., 2 F.P.C. 200 (1940).
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the period 1938-1954 was centered on the pipelines. A pipeline has
many characteristics of a traditional utility." 4 Its high fixed cost and
its monopoly position vis-a-vis the areas it serves provide the basis
for traditional utility regulation. Thus, the Commission has regulated
pipeline prices by use of the rate base cost-of-service approach." 5
Under this method, rates are fixed so as to return to the company its
cost of service plus a return on the investment in it (the "rate base").
Few serious problems arose during this period of federal regula-
tion. One case of importance to the subsequent development of the
law, however, involved an integrated producer-pipeline." 6 The pipe-
line sought to include in its cost of service the value of the gas it pro-
duced from its own properties. This value would be ascertained by
reference to the going price in the general production area (the "field
price"). Correlatively, the value of producing properties would be
excluded from the rate base. The FPC decided, however, and was
sustained by the courts, n17 that the field price method could not be
used and that the producer-pipelines had to include their production
facilities in their rate bases." 8
Another controversy prior to the Phillips decision involved the
valuation of pipeline properties. The underlying problem was that
pipelines had acquired at low cost vast tracts of gas-producing proper-
ty prior to the discovery of gas on it. The lines' cost-basis for this
property was low, although the land was currently invaluable. The
pipelines urged that these and their other properties should be in-
cluded in the rate base at current replacement cost; the FPC adopted
instead the figure of original cost less depreciation. 1 9 In the case of
Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 120 the Supreme
Court upheld the Commission on this point. In so doing, the Court
laid down the famous "end result" test: "Under the statutory standard
of 'just and reasonable' it is the result reached not the method em-
ployed which is controlling."121
Mr. Justice Jackson, dissenting in the Hope case,122 raised the ob-
vious question as to the Court's "end result" test: If the method em-
ployed by the Commission is not to be considered, how is one to tell
whether or not a rate is "just and reasonable"?'2 3 Confessing dismay,
114. McKrE 15.
115. See, e.g., FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575 (1942).
116. Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 581 (1945).
117. Ibid.
118. Id. at 600. This is still the law. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. FPC,
305 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
119. Hope Natural Gas Co., 3 F.P.C. 150 (1942).
120. 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
121. Id. at 602.
122. Id. at 628.
123. Id. at 645.
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he went on to give a now-classic analysis of the gas industry. The in-
tegrated pipeline-producer, he said, operates in two spheres: as a
pipeline it is a public utility, amenable to traditional utility regula-
tion; as a producer, however, it operates in an area where rate base
cost-of-service regulation makes no sense. 24 This technique of rate
regulation was designed to be used where a utility's monopoly posi-
tion meant that no market price was available for its services. But
natural gas is a commodity for which there is a competitive market,
and so utility regulation is not needed. A more fruitful line of inquiry
in fixing the price of natural gas, he suggested, would include the fol-
lowing questions: How far is the field price "established by arm's
length bargaining and how far ... influenced by agreements in re-
straint of trade or monopolistic influences?"' 2 If a company should
get more or less than field price for its own product, how much and
why? What is gas worth in terms of the fuels it displaces? Is the
price fixed an incentive to continue to exploit unoperated reserves and
to explore for new reserves?
126
C. Regulation Between 1954 and the Policy Statement
In 1954 the United States Supreme Court cast a new light on the
whole natural gas arena, deciding in the case of Phillips Petroleum Co.
v. Wisconsin12 7 that independent producers of natural gas were natural
gas companies subject to the provisions of the Natural Gas Act, and
that their sales of natural gas to interstate pipelines did not fall within
the Act's exemption for "production and gathering."'2 The Commis-
sion responded to the Phillips decision by issuing a series of orders
setting up the mechanics of regulation of independent producers. 129
For its trouble, the Commission was immediately buried under an
124. A traditional utility supplied a "service," and to value it the rate base method
was developed. This method was needed since the utility, a monopoly, did not sell
its services in a competitive market. But gas turns this topsy-turvy. Gas is tangible
and has a price in the field. On the other hand, the value of its rate base is more
elusive than the value of the gas itself. Id. at 647-49.
125. Id. at 654.
126. Id. at 654-55.
127. 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
128. If Congress had intended the Natural Gas Act to cover only interstate pipelines,
said the Court, then the language "or sale for resale" in § 1 would be superfluous. Id.
at 681-82. Justices Douglas and Clark dissented, pointing out the legislative history.
Id. at 688, 691.
129. The Phillips decision was handed down in June 1954. The Commission promptly
began to issue its "174" series of orders governing independent producers. Order No.
174, 13 F.P.C. 1195 (1954), was issued on July 16. In November 1954, the Commis-
sion initiated a hearing to determine principles to govern producer cases. Hillyer, A
Primer on Producer Price Regulation, in OIL AND GAS OPEnATIONS 345, 357-58.
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avalanche of certificate and rate filings; 30 not until 1960 did it take
forthright action to revive itself.
Mr. Justice Jackson had pointed out in Hope that it was doubtful
that the rate base cost-of-service type of regulation should be applied
to the production facilities of integrated pipeline-producers. 13' A
fortiori, it was even more questionably applied to independent pro-
ducers. Furthermore, logic aside, a rate base cost-of-service hearing
is a time-consuming procedure. 132 However, this method was all the
Commission had, and a mandate for its use was soon forthcoming from
the courts.
The case of City of Detroit v. Federal Power Commission'3 in-
volved an integrated pipeline producer. Reversing its previous
stand,'134 the Commission had computed a "field price" for gas, looking
to the prices established by federally unregulated bargaining for simi-
lar gas in the field. It then gave the pipeline applicant, Panhandle
Eastern, as part of its cost of service, the value of the gas produced
from its own properties, computed on the basis of the field price.135
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia stated
that the Commission was not bound to use only the traditional rate
base method, even though it might lead to lower rates than the field
price determination gave. 136 Nevertheless, said the court, "it is essen-
tial in such a case as this that it [the rate base method] be used as a
basis of comparison." 37 Remanding the case for the Commission's
failure to take cost evidence, the court added that if the Commission
intends "to abandon the treatment historically accorded pipeline-
produced gas in rate making on the ground that the ultimate public
interest will be better served thereby, the Commission should justify
it on the record."1
Reading the City of Detroit case to require cost evidence in pro-
ducer cases, the Commission began to dismiss applications for rate
130. In the two years after the Phillips decision there were 4,431 rate increase
applications and 7,738 certificate applications filed. 1957 PROCEEDINGS OF ABA SECTION
oF MmmRAL AND NATURAL RFsotRCEs LAw 75.
131. FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U1.S. 591, 647-48 (1944) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting).
132. In a recent case seven years elapsed between the date of the rate filing and
the close of review proceedings. The case is discussed in FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 32
U.S.L. WEEK 4370, 4373 n.13 (U.S. April 20, 1964).
133. 230 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 829 (1956).
134. In the case of Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 581 (1945), the
Commission had successfully resisted an attempt by a producing pipeline to force it to
use the field price method.
135. The field price was the weighted average of prices achieved in federally un-
regulated bargaining in the field.
136. 230 F.2d 814-15.




increases when such evidence was not produced.139 In hearing after
hearing, however, gas was shown to be underpriced;14 in addition an
enormous backlog of filings was steadily accumulating.141 Thus the
Commission again began to consider abandoning rate base cost-of-
service regulation. In doing this, it did not have a clear and consistent
line of judicial directives within which it could maneuver. The
Hope' 42 case on the one hand had left the door open for considerable
variation in regulatory technique, but City of Detroit on the other
hand seemed to require the use of the rate base method at some stage
in almost every proceeding.
The Commission used two approaches to bypass rate base regulation
in section 4 rate filings. First, in some cases a token bow was made
in the direction of cost evidence, followed by a decision based on a
field price approach. 43 Second, the Commission began to use its
discretion in deciding whether or not to suspend and investigate pro-
posed rate increases.14 Orders vacating prior suspensions were used
to whittle down the backlog of pending cases. Several grounds were
used to justify vacation: (1) that a higher rate than that requested
had been previously certificated in the area;145 (2) that the applicant
had agreed to eliminate indefinite pricing clauses;146 (3) that only a
small amount was involved; 47 or (4) that some other form of settle-
ment had been reached. 148 The first of these is an obvious bypass of
the City of Detroit requirement.
139. The Commission adopted rate base regulation for independent producers in
Union Oil Co., 16 F.P.C. 100 (1956), aff'd sub nom., Bel Oil Corp. v. FPC, 225 F.2d
548 (5th Cir. 1958). In a number of subsequent cases the Commission denied requested
increases because the producers did not submit rate base evidence. E.g., Sun Oil Co.,
17 F.P.C. 174, 194-95 (1957); see Note, 75 Hnv. L. REv. 549, 555 (1962).
140. Ibid.
141. See note 3 supra.
142. FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., supra note 131.
143. See Pan American Petroleum Corp., 19 F.P.C. 463 (1958), where very little
cost evidence was introduced. "In this case ten of the eleven rate proponents . . . are
engaged in extensive . . . operations throughout the country, so that these proceedings
represent only a fragmentary portion of the operations of any one company. . . . To
require rate base evidence in a case of this kind would necessitate . . . a complete
examination of their entire plant and operations in order to regulate only a fraction of
their sales. Such a procedure would involve an extensive taking of evidence that
would delay the fixing of rates for years to the public detriment and would be a
wholly infeasible administrative procedure." Id. at 467.
144. See Note, 75 HAzv. L. B:v. 549, 556 & nn. 71-72 (1962).
145. See, e.g., Reef Fields Gasoline Corp., 19 F.P.C. 351 (1958). This and the
other developments are noted in the Report of the Committee on Natural Gas in the
1960 PnOCamaNS OF ABA SECTION OF MiNEnAL AND NATURAL RFsouncEs LAw
71-72.
146. This has been a leading factor. Note, 75 HAnv. L. REv. 549, 557 (1962).
147. See 1960 PRocEEDxNGs OF ABA SECTION OF MINMM AND NATURAL REsounCs
LAW 71-72.
148. The settlement technique was extensively used. Note, 75 HAny. L. REv. 549,
556 (1962).
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In another line of development, rate considerations began to play
a part in section 7 certification proceedings. Once certificated, an
initial rate cannot be suspended while its lawfulness is being deter-
mined. 49 In order to exercise some influence on initial prices, the
Commission at first assumed the power to condition certification upon
the applicant's acceptance of a decreased initial price. 50 Later, how-
ever, it abandoned this position, feeling that the safeguard of a section
4 hearing should be provided in any Commission rate regulation.'51 In
the well-known Catco case,152 however, the Supreme Court remanded
a certification proceeding to the Commission, stating that:
where the proposed price is not in keeping with the public interest be-
cause its approval might result in a triggering of general price rises or an
increase in the applicant's existing rates by reason of "favored nation" clauses
or otherwise, the Commission in the exercise of its discretion might attach
such conditions as it believes necessary.15 3
Pointing to the inadequacy of a section 5 proceeding in providing
complete consumer protection, the Court said that the Commission
must "hold the line awaiting adjudication of a just and reasonable
rate."154 Subsequent decisions have refined the "holding of the line"
doctrine,155 but it has been kept essentially in its original form, using
principally a field price method of price control. 56
D. Stirrings in the Legislative Branch
Seven years before the Phillips decision was rendered, legislation
was introduced into Congress to exempt independent producers from
Commission jurisdiction.157 Since that time similar legislation has
been proposed almost every year.'58 On two occasions both houses of
149. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 20 F.P.C. 264, 273 (1958).
150. Signal Oil & Gas Co., 14 F.P.C. 134 (1955), aff'd, 238 F.2d 771 (3d Cir. 1956),
cert. denied, 353 U.S. 923 (1957).
151. Seaboard Oil Co., 19 F.P.C. 416 (1958).
152. Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378 (1959).
153. Id. at 391.
154. Id. at 392.
155. For example, in establishing the price line the Commission may not rely on
other prices which are under review in pending court or Commission proceedings; such
prices are under a "cloud." Texaco Seaboard Inc., 47 P.U.R.3d 470 (FPC 1963).
Where a substantial number of prices in an area are under review, like prices in the
same area are also suspect and may not be relied on. United Gas Improvement Co. v.
FPC, 283 F.2d 817, 824 (9th Cir. 1960). And the prices relied on must come from
the same or a similar area as that under scrutiny. Id. at 823. Furthermore, prices deter-
mined in a hearing in which petitioner was denied the right to intervene may not, so
long as the denial is under review, be relied upon. Id. at 825.
156. See, e.g., California Oil Co. v. FPC, 315 F.2d 652 (10th Cir. 1963).
157. H.R. 2185, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954).
158. See the annual reports of the ABA Section of Mineral and Natural Resources
for a summary of each year's legislative efforts. The history of these attempts is given




Congress have passed bills to this effect;159 in both instances the Presi-
dent vetoed them.160 Approaches other than exemption have been
tried; none have succeeded. Bills have been introduced which would:
restrict Commission authority to a determination of whether a "reason-
able market price" had been achieved; 1 1 outlaw the use of certain
types of indefinite pricing clauses; 62 exempt "small" producers from
Commission jurisdiction; 6 3 or give the Commission the job of ascer-
taining that prices in each gas-producing area are set competitively.1'
IV. NEw APPRoAcHEs
A. Area Pricing
By the time the Phillips case got back to the Commission,165 the
burden of producer regulation had become intolerable. On the other
hand, the Commission's venture into field pricing in vacating suspen-
sion orders had proven profitable. 16 Furthermore, the Supreme Court's
mandate in Catco to "hold the line" and to consider existing area price
lines in the conditioning of certificates indicated that the Court might
look with favor upon the more general application of such a technique.
On September 28, 1960, the Commission attempted a generalization
of the field price approach when it announced in the Phillips deci-
sion, 67 and in the accompanying Statement of General Policy No. 61-1
[hereinafter referred to simply as the Policy Statement], a new area
pricing plan.
1. The Policy Statement.-The appendix to the Policy Statement
set out two rates for the gas produced in each of twenty-three areas-
the first price is to apply to contracts executed after the date of the
Policy Statement, and is in most cases higher than the second price,
159. The Kerr-Harris Bill, H.R. 1758, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950), and the Harris-
Fulbright Bill, H.R. 6645, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955).
160. Heard, supra note 158, at 412-14. President Eisenhower's veto was reluctant,
and he specifically indicated that such legislation was necessary. Id. at 413.
161. Harris-Fulbright Bill, H.R. 6645, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955).
162. H.R. 6211, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955).
163. S. 1926, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955).
164. H.R. 3940, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955). This bill would have amended § 1(b)
of the Act by inserting an exemption for arm's length sales of gas by independent
producers. It would further have added a § 1(d), to read in part as follows: "It shall
be the duty of the Commission to assemble and keep current pertinent information
relevant to determination of whether, by reason of lack of effective competition among
producers or gatherers of natural gas, the flow of natural gas into interstate commerce
is being or will be unduly retarded or interfered with or the price of natural gas sold
in interstate commerce for resale is being or will be unduly affected." Upon so finding,
the Commission would report to the President and to Congress.
165. The same case, Docket G-1148, which the Supreme Court remanded in its 1954
decision ordering the Commission to regulate independent producers.
166. See text accompanying notes 143-48 supra.
167. Phillips Petroleum Co., 24 F.P.C. 537 (1960).
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which is to apply to rate increases in existing contracts. 6 s The rate
standards are to serve, the Commission stated, "as a guide... in deter-
mining whether proposed initial rates should be certificated without a
price condition and whether proposed rate changes should be accepted
or suspended."16 9 Thus these first area prices were intended solely for
the guidance of the Commission in (a) "holding the line" in section 7
proceedings and (b) deciding whether or not to suspend in section 4
proceedings. The use of these standards will not, said the Commission,
"deprive any party of substantive rights or fix the ultimate justness
and reasonableness of any rate level."
7 0
If a proposed price exceeds the tentative standards of the Policy
Statement, and is therefore conditioned or suspended, a hearing must
be held to determine what is a just and reasonable price for gas in
the area concered.17 This determination is to be "in the nature of
setting a price for the gas itself from any source questioned and not
necessarily a price applicable solely to the party proposing some
other price." 72 All interested parties are to be invited to join in any
proceeding connected with an area rate determination.
The Commission acknowledged not only that the prices set out
in the Policy Statement were tentative, but also that the geographic
areas used might need to be redefined at some later date. 1 3 Although
the Commission gave no specific direction for the determining of an
area price, it did list the factors considered in setting the tentative
Policy Statement prices: 4 (1) cost information from all pending
and decided cases; (2) existing and historical price structures; (3)
volumes of production; (4) trends in production; (5) price trends;
(6) exploration and development trends; (7) trends in demand; and
(8) the available markets for the gas. Since that time the Commission
has confirmed that these factors are the relevant considerations in
setting area prices 75
2. Subsequent Developments.-Two area rate proceedings have
been initiated. 76 The participants in the first quickly sought instruc-
168. 24 F.P.C. 818, 820 (1960), codified in 18 C.F.R. § 2.56(a) (1961). "Initial
prices in new contracts are, and in many cases by virtue of economic factors, must be
higher than the prices contained in old contracts.... It is anticipated that these differ-
ences in price levels will be reduced and eventually eliminated as subsequent experience
brings about revisions in the prices in the various areas." Id. at 819.
169. 24 F.P.C. 819, codified in 18 C.F.R. § 2.56(a) (1961).
170. 24 F.P.C. 820, codified in 18 C.F.R. § 2.56(a) (1961).
171. Ibid.
172. Ibid.
173. 24 F.P.C. 819, codified in 18 C.F.R. § 2.56(a) (1961).
174. Ibid.
175. Area Rate Proceeding AR61-1, 26 F.P.C. 247 (1961).
176. Area Rate Proceeding AR61-1, 24 F.P.C. 1121 (1960), involving the Permian
Basin, in which some 400 cases involving 350 independent producers were consolidated,
and Area Rate Proceeding AR61-2, 25 F.P.C. 942 (1961), involving the southern
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tions from the Commission on exactly what sort of cost evidence was
required.177 The Commission responded that rate base cost-of-service
studies could not be introduced in area rate proceedings, regardless
of whether these studies pertained to one producer or to groups of
producers.17 8 This does not mean, however, that all cost data is
barred; indeed, said the Commission, measuring the financial require-
ments of the industry requires the consideration of many items of
cost that are included in traditional cost of service. 79 But to be useful
in an area rate proceeding, cost data must be "consistently and
uniformly developed on a group basis"; 180 it "should encompass in-
dustry-wide data or data for a substantial segment of a group of
similar producers";18' and it "must be compiled ... so as to set forth
costs pertaining to" the area in question.
182
Cost data forms have been developed for use in area rate hear-
ings, 83 and steps have been taken to streamline the proceedings.
18
Furthermore, the Commission has given some indication how it plans
to proceed after an area hearing has been concluded. In the course of
one hearing, a producer moved to be allowed, after the area rates
were determined, to demonstrate the reasonableness of his own
rates. 185 The Commission stated that "it would appear that such
presentations subsequent to the issuance of a general rate order
would vitiate the purpose of the hearing."186 Thus it is clear that the
Commission intends to fix prices; after they are fixed individual
producers will not be allowed to raise the confiscation issue.
3. Judicial Comment.-The area pricing plan has not yet been tested
in the courts. However, judicial dicta on regulation under the Policy
Louisiana area. Recently the Commission voted to begin two other area proceedings.
Wall Street Journal, Dec. 2, 1963, p. 7, cols. 1 & 2.
177. Area Rate Proceeding AR61-1, CCH FED. UTm. L. REP. 1 10122 (FPC 1961).




182. Ibid. Cf. Area Rate Proceeding AR61-1, 26 F.P.C. 247, 248 (1961), where the
Commission ordered that cost data be included in the record on all producers in the
area.
183. See Area Rate Proceeding AR61-2, 27 F.P.C. 1038 (1962); Area Rate Procecd-
ing AR61-1, 27 F.P.C. 20 (1962).
184. Prehearing conferences are to be used. Area Rate Proceeding AR61-1, 24 F.P.C.
1121 (1960). Direct oral testimony is disallowed; all exhibits and testimony are to be
written. Area Rate Proceeding AR61-2, 29 F.P.C. 981 (1963). Simplified presentation
of data is permitted for small (less than ten million mef annual production) producers.
Area Rate Proceeding AR61-2, 28 F.P.C. 1001 (1962). Cumulative presentations are
disallowed. Area Rate Proceeding AR61-2, 29 F.P.C. 981, 982 (1963). Appeals made
during the course of an area hearing will not be entertained by the FPC except in
extraordinary circumstances. Area Rate Proceeding AR61-1, 29 F.P.C. 1101 (1963).
185. Area Rate Proceeding AR61-1, 26 F.P.C. 247, 248 (1961).
186. Ibid. However the Commission stated also that a ruling on this motion would
be premature.
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Statement reflect general uncertainty as to both the operation and
the legality of the plan.187
Most courts seem ready to allow the Commission to experiment.
In a certificate case, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit said
that the Commission would never be able "to process certificates on
an individualized basis. The hopes for a practical solution must rest
in generalized area-pricing or similar resourceful adaption of law and
life."' 18  And in the case of Atlantic Refining Co. v. Federal Power
Commission,189 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
agreed that the Commission should be given "some latitude" in
proceeding on an area basis. 190 But, cautioned the court, "if area
pricing degenerates into mere acceptance of the contract price in the
producing area, then will be time enough to stay the commission's
hand."191 Thus, in the eyes of some members of the District of
Columbia Circuit,192 some shadow of City of Detroit lives on. The
court's caution, motivated by concern for consumer interests, can be
read to mean that a form of area pricing which has reference only to
competitively set contract prices will be unacceptable. To the same
effect is a dictum of the Seventh Circuit, which said that "promulga-
tion of policy and area ceiling prices does not conclusively establish
the proposed rates as applicable in any particular case." 193 The
thrust here, however, is toward protection of the producer against
confiscation. On the other hand, some judges of the District of
Columbia Circuit have indicated that regulation under the Policy
Statement could rely principally on a competitively set market
price:
194
Almost the whole of the economics of merchandising differs from the
economics of public utility service. Are the just and reasonable prices of
such a merchandiser limited to fair return on his own investment and prices
paid by him (and, if so, what investment and what prices), or are those
prices reasonably measured by the fair prices for the product as measured
by the open competitive market for the product, evaluated by Commission
expertise and data on the whole of the market operation? Either criterion
is a method of regulation. It seems to us that the choice must lie with the
Commission. 95
187. See Note, 75 HIv. L. REv. 549 (1962), for an articulate statement of the
doubts as to the plan's legality and operational feasibility.
188. Hunt v. FPC, 306 F.2d 334, 343 (5th Cir. 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 376
U.S. 515 (1964). (Footnote omitted.)
189. 316 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
190. Id. at 680.
191. ibid.
192. Judges Wright, Bastian, and Fahy rendered the decision in the Atlantic Refining
case.
193. Pure Oil Co. v. FPC, 292 F.2d 350, 353 (7th Cir. 1961).
194. Wisconsin v. FPC, 303 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir. 1961), aff'd, 373 U.S. 94 (1963).
Judges Prettyman and Danaher wrote the majority opinion.
195. Id. at 388.
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And the Tenth Circuit has similarly indicated that the spirit of the
area rate principle involves exclusion of cost evidence.195
The Supreme Court, reviewing the decision on remand of the
famous Phillips case, has also expressed some views on area pricing.
197
Noting carefully that the validity of regulation under the Policy State-
ment was not before it,198 the Court began by reiterating the Hope
rule that the Commission is not restricted to a single method of rate
regulation. 99 The Court then said:
To whatever extent the matter of costs may be a requisite element in rate
regulation, we have no indication that the area method will fall short of
statutory or constitutional standards. . . . Surely, we cannot say that the
rates to be developed in these proceedings will in all likelihood be so high
as to deprive consumers or so low as to deprive producers, of their right to
a just and reasonable rate.2 00
In a significant footnote, the Court stated that it did not consider the
City of Detroit case to require the use of the individual company cost
of service method of rate regulation for independent producers of
natural gas.20
1
The dissenters1 2 disagreed sharply with the majority, both as to the
wisdom of expressing an opinion about area pricing,20 3 and as to what
it saw to be the majority's conclusion.201 The dissent began by point-
ing out that area pricing might fail to provide adequate consumer
protection.2 5 It then went on to point out that application of the
plan might result in unconstitutional confiscation; whatever price is
set will inevitably be either lower than that required by the high
cost producer or higher than that needed by the low cost producer,
and, if an average is used, it will be both.20 6 Thus, the dissenters
concluded,
the cold truth is that, after all of its area pricing investigation and the fxibng
of a rate pursuant thereto, the producer aggrieved at that rate may demand
and be entitled to a full hearing on his cost. The result is additional delay,
delay and delay until the inevitable day when there is no more gas to
regulate.
207
196. California Oil Co. v. FPC, 315 F.2d 652 (10th Cir. 1963).
197. Wisconsin v. FPC, 373 U.S. 294 (1963).
198. Id. at 307-08.
199. Id. at 309-10.
200. Ibid. (Footnote omitted.)
201. Id. at 310 n.16.
202. Justices Clark, Black, and Brennan, together with the Chief Justice.
203. Id. at 326-27.
204. "I notice the court proceeds to discuss the Statement and strongly implies a view
as to its validity." Id. at 326.
205. "It can hardly be denied that the Commission's action will leave producers for
a number of years . . . without effective regulation and will result in irreparable injury
to the consumer of gas." Id. at 327.
206. Id. at 328.
207. Ibid.
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Citing the experience of the NLRB and the Wage and Hour Adminis-
tration, the dissent pointed out that other agencies have solved
congestion problems by exempting inconsequential cases.208 The clear
implication of this suggestion is that, in addition to the area plan's
ilegality, there is further imperfection in the suggestion that regula-
tion under the Policy Statement is the Commission's only hope.
B. Abolition of Indefinite Pricing Clauses
Widespread use of indefinite pricing clauses has compounded the
regulatory ills of the natural gas industry. A single new gas sale
contract with price higher than any previously set in the area can,
under two-party and third-party favored nation clauses, trigger a
flurry of rate increase filings. 20 9 Legislation aimed at abolishing the
use of such clauses has failed of passage.2 10 In 1961, in the case of
Pure Oil Co.,21' and accompanying Order No. 232,212 the Commission
decided to take such action on its own.213
1. The Regulations.-Section 154.93 of the Commission's current
regulations provides that, with certain exceptions, provisions for the
change of the price in a gas sale contract executed after the date of
the order shall be inoperative.2 14 The provisions permitted by the
regulations are: (a) a provision that changes price to reimburse the
seller for increases in taxes on production, selling, or gathering; (b)
a provision that changes price to a specific amount at a definite date;
and (c) a provision that allows, once in a five year contract period
when there has been no operation of a provision as described in (b)
above, a price change at a fixed date by renegotiation (the renego-
tiated price must be based upon and not higher than rates of
producers in the same area subject to FPC jurisdiction which are
not in issue in a certificate or suspension proceeding). The section
provides further that any contract executed after April 2, 1962, con-
taining other than permissible price change clauses shall be summarily
rejected. 21
5
2. Legality.-The principal objection raised to the Commission's
regulations outlawing the use of indefinite pricing clauses was that
they deprived natural gas companies of their statutory right to a
208. Id. at 329.
209. Superior Oil Co. v. FPC, 322 F.2d 601, 619-20 (9th Cir. 1963).
210. E.g., H.R. 6211, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955).
211. 25 F.P.C. 383 (1961).
212. 26 Fed. Reg. 2850 (1961), as amended, 27 Fed. Reg. 1357 (1962), codified in
18 C.F.R. § 154.93 (Supp. 1964).
213. The history of the Commission's treatment of indefinite pricing is given in
Superior Oil Co. v. FPC, supra note 209, at 605-08.




hearing. 216 On this ground, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals set
aside a Commission order rejecting a certificate filing in which the
proposed contract contained a forbidden price change clause:
27
The summary rejection of applications based on contracts containing
price-changing clauses, of which the commission does not approve, deprives
the natural gas companies of their statutory right to a hearing, ignores the
statutory standards, and precludes the possibility of any effective judicial
review.
218
In the Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, a similar order was upheld,2 9
the court specifically mentioning the flood of filings which may result
in an area where indefinite pricing clauses are in common use.
20
The conflict between the circuits has recently been authoritatively
settled. In the case of Federal Power Commission v. Texaco, Inc.,
221
the Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit and held that the
Commission could enforce the ban on indefinite pricing clauses. The
Court held that the case was governed by established administrative
law principles, 2 2 under which section 7's hearing requirement did
"not preclude the Commission from particularizing statutory stand-
ards through the rule-making process and barring at the threshold
those who neither measure up to them nor show reasons why in the
public interest the rule should be waived."223 There is a procedure
whereby an applicant can seek a waiver of Commission rules,224 but in
this case that procedure was not used. To the gas companies' con-
tention that the terms of their contract had to be passed on in an
adversary proceeding, the Court replied that the regulations in
question were conditions "that relate to the ability of applicants to
serve the consumer interest ... ."225 Furthermore, added the Court,
216. The theory was that certificate applicants are entitled under section 7 to a
hearing on their applications. Summary rejection of applications was said to deprive
producers of their statutory right to present evidence in an adversary proceeding show-
ing the reasonableness of the contract.
217. Texaco, Inc. v. FPC, 317 F.2d 796 (10th Cir. 1963), rev'd, 32 U.S.L. WEEK
4370 (U.S. April 20, 1964).
218. Id. at 807.
219. Superior Oil Co. v. FPC, supra note 209.
220. Id. at 619-20.
221. 32 U.S.L. WEEK 4370 (U.S. April 20, 1964).
222. The Court held that the case was governed by the principle of United States v.
Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956). In that case the FCC had promulgated a
rule limiting permissible multiple ownership of radio and television stations. Affirming
the denial of a hearing based on this rule, the Court said that the rule was reasonable
since there was in the FCC's regulations a provision whereby any rule could be waived
upon a showing of exceptional circumstances.
223. 32 U.S.L. WEi 4372.
224. 18 C.F.R. § 1.7(b) (Supp. 1964).
225. 32 U.S.L. WEEK 4372. "They are kin to the kind of capital structure that an
applicant has and to his ability by reason of the rate structure to serve the public
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to require the Commission to proceed on a case-by-case basis would
be to require the needless formality of repeating, in hearing after
hearing, the conclusions that condemn all indefinite pricing clauses.
226
V. EVALUATION OF THE AREA PRICING PLAN
Experience with area pricing is limited.227 The Commission has
indicated an intention to use cost evidence in setting area rates
228
and to set an area price for all producers in an area, regardless of
individual costs.22 But these statements of intention are far from
settled rules. Thus, most of what can be said about area pricing must
of necessity be conjectural and theoretical. With these reservations
in mind, the objections that have been raised to area pricing will
now be examined.
A. Practicality
It has been questioned whether the area pricing plan will, in its
practical operation, be any more satisfactory than the old rate base
method.2S0 Difficulties inherent in the area approach and problems
arising because of lack of experience and of a blueprint for action
make an affirmative answer doubtful.
Individual producer rate and certificate cases proved to be time-
consuming affairs. 231 Area rate cases seem destined to be even more
so. 232 Each area proceeding is the consolidation of hundreds of in-
dividual cases; to receive evidence from and allow cross-examination
by such a large number of participants must take time. The Commis-
sion has taken some steps to speed up area hearings, 3 and, of course,
interest." Ibid. "Natural gas companies that seek to enter the field with prearranged
escalator clauses and the like have a built-in device for ready manipulation of rates
upwards. Protection of the consumer interests against that device may be best achieved
if it is done at the very threshold of the enterprise." Id. at 4372-73.
226. Id. at 4373.
227. To date, only two area proceedings have been undertaken, note 178 supra, and
neither has reached the decision stage.
228. See notes 177-82 supra and accompanying text.
229. See notes 185-86 supra and accompanying text.
230. See Note, 75 HAuv. L. REv. 549, 561-64 (1962), for a full discussion. Orn,
Area Pricing of Natural Gas by the Federal Power Commission, in OM. AND GAs OPEaA-
TIoNS 371, expounds the thesis that to base the area pricing method upon rate-base
methods would be unworkable. Id. at 378-98.
231. See note 132 supra.
232. The first proceeding, begun in 1961, has not yet reached the stage of decision
by the Commission. The hearing before the examiner lasted two and one-half years
and produced more than thirty thousand pages of testimony and 337 exhibits. Wall
Street Journal, Dec. 2, 1963, p. 7, cols. 1 & 2. Commissioner Charles R. Ross dissented
from the Commission's decision to institute new area proceedings. Ibid. "The actual
period of time consumed in deciding, applying, and reviewing the most important area
cases will certainly be far longer than four years." Reply Brief of Long Island Lighting
Co., Philadelphia Elec. Co., and United Gas Improvement Co., Wisconsin v. FPC, 373
U.S. 294 (1963), p. 25.
233. See note 184 supra.
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experience will lead to further expediting of procedures. Perhaps
imposition on producers of a uniform system of accounting, such as
that already required of pipelines,2m would simplify data collection.
There are presently twenty-three areas designated by the Com-
mission. Only two area rate proceedings have been started. By the
time the twenty-third is accomplished, it is not at all unlikely that
the participants in the first ten to twenty will have been clamoring
for some time that changing conditions make a new determination
necessary. The Commission has not indicated how frequently it will
compute an area price. However, without a tremendous expansion
in the size of its staff, it is hard to see how the Commission can keep
from falling ever further behind in its regulatory task. Consequently,
the rates of individual producers will be frozen for extended periods
at old area levels while new proceedings are pending.25
A problem of rate base regulation that will remain as a thorn in
the side of every area proceeding is that of allocation236 Since gas
and oil are explored for and often produced jointly,2 7 the costs of
their joint production must be allocated between them. To date, no
satisfactory method of allocation has been found;238 it has been sug-
gested that none exists.a3s In addition to oil-gas allocation, some
provision will have to be made for the fact that many producers
operate in more than one area.20
For the first years of regulation, area proceedings will go forward
under a cloud of doubt as to final judicial approval of area principles
and techniques. Of course, the Hope doctrine may again be used by
the courts to abdicate their responsibility in the regulatory process.241
Assuming that the judiciary plays its proper role, however, there will
be inevitable delay both in getting approval for the broad aims of
area pricing and in clarifying on a case-by-case basis the detailed
workings of the program.
The details of area pricing cannot be worked out, of course, until its
234. 18 C.F.R. Parts 201, 204, 205 (1961). "The thousands of independent pro-
ducers, making up the largest single group within the Commission's jurisdiction, have
not been subjected to a comprehensive uniform system of accounts and records even
though the Commission recognizes the necessity of this for effective regulation." Brief
for State of California and Public Utilities Commission of the State of California, Wis-
consin v. FPC, 373 U.S. 294 (1963), p. 27.
235. MAcAvoY 255. The tentative Policy Statement ceilings, at which prices in all
twenty-three areas are still frozen, are based on the price structure of September 1960.
Wisconsin v. FPC, supra note 232, at 316 (dissenting opinion).
236. See Orn, supra note 230, at 379-87.
237. Id. at 379.
238. Id. at 381-82; ADELMN 28-29.
239. Om calls the problem "inherently insolvable." Orn, supra note 230, at 378. See
ADE.MAN 28-29.
240. Note, 75 HAIv. L. Rzv. 549, 563 (1962).
241. See note 123 supra and accompanying text.
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broad aim is known. The Commission has listed the factors it will
consider in setting an area price;2 2 however, it has not stated exactly
how these factors will be put together to arrive at a result. Possibly
the Commission intends to find an average cost figure, but the indica-
tions are otherwise. The signs, unfortunately, point to the conclusion
that the Commission intends to tediously compile a mass of statistical
evidence of obscure relevance, and then with the magic touch of
"expertise" draw forth a price.243
242. See note 174 supra and accompanying text.
243. The Commission's instructions with respect to cost data can only be described
as vague. See notes 177-82 supra and accompanying text. And the Commission has
never attempted to state how an area price will be arrived at. The Commission staff,
however, has spoken of the use of "economic analysis" to achieve "the measured answers
which economic theory and an enormous amount of data afford." ABA Utility Section
Newsletter, Jan. 1, 1964, p. 2. To collect this data the Commission has sent 114 natural
gas producers questionnaires consisting of 428 data sheets and weighing ten pounds.
It is estimated that to complete one of these forms would require 17,000 accountant
man-hours and 85,000 dollars in salary costs. Editorial, Wall Street Journal, Jan. 27,
1964, p. 8, cols. 1 & 2.
The litigants in Wisconsin v. FPC, 373 U.S. 294 (1963), had something to say on
this point. "Neither the Commission's original statement nor any of its pronouncements
since have indicated how all of these various factors were weighed or evaluated one as
against the other." Brief for Petitioners State of Wisconsin, Public Service Commission
of Wisconsin, and Public Service Commission of the State of New York, Wisconsin v.
FPC, 373 U.S. 294 (1963), p. 30. "The Policy Statement acts like a programmed
computer. Feed rate schedules into the machine, put certificate applications into the
right slot-and out come the approvals or the rejects. Where is the judgment? Where
is the expertise? Form and policy have been stored in the computer, but do facts, evi-
dence and argument play any role in determining whether the schedule or application
is stamped 'approved' or 'rejected'? The answer is NO." Petition for Rehearing by the
People of the State of California and the Public Utility Commission of the State of
California, Wisconsin v. FPC, 373 U.S. 294 (1963), p. 7.
The following excerpts from oral argument are also illuminating:
"'MR JUSTICE CLARK: ...
"I wonder if you would tell me just how the Commission then goes in, we will say,
to the Permian Basin-how they arrive at an area price ....
"MR. SOLOMON: We have got all the contracts there. We have got all the informa-
tion from all the producers there-cost information as well as economic information of
their nation-wide exploration and development activities, and their nation-wide produc-
tion activities. We have got all the information there as to their operations in the
Permian Basin itself. And we are attempting, by looking at the cost and economic
information for the nation-because part of this problem is a nation-wide problem-and
for the specific area, to determine a price of gas to be sold from there which will be as
low as possible because that, of course, is our statutory obligation, but still be sufficiently
high to bring gas to the interstate market, which, of course, would be sufficiently high
to pay for the exploration and development activities of the gas companies and bring
this gas to the existing market.
"I do want to make clear here, Mr. Justice Clark, that the suggestion that going to
area pricing is junking cost considerations is completely untrue.
"MR. JUSTICE CLARK: What weight do they give the going price? Every field, I
suppose, or every contract has a going price in it. So what weight do you give that?
You say they take the costs of development and everything like that.
"MR. SOLOMON: The weight, if any, which the so-called area price, field price,
existing field price, will be given by the Commission in the Permian Basin case, or the
other area cases, still is to be determined, but, if there is one thing that is clear, it is
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B. Legality24
The Natural Gas Act does not spell out the method of regulation
that the FPC is to use. However, its provisions are drafted on the
assumption that regulation will be carried out on an individual basis.
Thus, section 4 places on the individual applicant the burden of
showing that a requested rate increase is just and reasonable. 2 5
Provision is made for an individual hearing. Under area pricing,
however, this individual treatment would not be afforded, 246 or would
become a mere formality, if the area price had previously been set.
It has been suggested that the Act's "policy of individualization"
2 47
is not completely nullified by the use of area pricing-that in cases
of confiscation or other special circumstances the individual producer
may seek a variance from the area price, and that any producer may
seek to show that a rate is unjust and unreasonable because area
conditions do not justify it.248 This exception, if allowed, would likely
swallow the rule. Almost every high-cost producer would argue that
his special circumstances-e.g., poor luck in exploration-justified a
higher price for his gas than the area rate. To allow any producer to
raise individually the objection that area conditions do not justify
the area rate would result in a hundred rehearings of every area case.
On the other hand, the area price will probably exceed a fair return
that the Commission has no intention of fixing area prices on the basis of field prices,
the price which is actually being bargained for." Bound Transcript of Oral Argument,
Wisconsin v. FPC, 373 U.S. 294, Jan. 9, 1963, pp. 48-49.
"MR. SOLOMON: We are starting out to get the underlying costs and to apply
these underlying costs to the problem of fixing fair prices.
"MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN: I have heard you say that but you haven't told me how
you are going to do it.
"MR. SOLOMON: We have, for example, in the Permian Basin case-now I am going
to talk about the staff presentation because other people have different ideas-we put
into the Permian Basin what the staff has determined, on the basis of extensive question-
naires and information that it received, is a cost for exploration development.
"Now, this I indicate is a national cost. I don't know what this figure is, but let us
say it is 30. A cost which experience in the industry shows that they are spending per
Mef, whatever that means, of gas to do sufficient exploration to find nev gas. That is
one basic cost in this. There are other costs. The operating costs of lifting gas and
drilling in this particular case. We have derived in effect a composite cost of service
for the Permian Basin." Id. at 56-57.
244. See Wisconsin v. FPC, supra note 232, at 326-28 (dissenting opinion); Orn,
supra note 230, at 388-90; Note, 75 HAv. L. REv. 549, 564-68 (1962).
245. Natural Gas Act § 4(e), 52 Stat. 822 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 717c(e)
(1958).
246. See note 186 supra and accompanying text.
247. Note, 75 Hnv. L. REv. 549, 566 (1962).
248. Id. at 567. In oral argument the Commission's counsel said that "obviously, we
are going to have to set up a procedure whereby a man who believes that there is con-
fiscation can bring his claim .. " Bound Transcript of Oral Argument, Wisconsin v.
FPC, 373 U.S. 294, Jan. 9, 1963, p. 52.
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to the low-cost producers in an area.29 To the extent that prices are
set higher than necessary for any individual producer, consumer
interests will charge that such a producer is making windfall profits
and thus that the principal aim of the Natural Gas Act, consumer
protection, is not served.
The Natural Gas Act was designed to regulate pipelines, which are
traditional utilities.250 Thus it is not surprising that the Act was
drafted on the assumption that rate base cost-of-service regulation
would be used2 1 However, since the Phillips case independent
producers have been regulated under the Natural Gas Act. Although
rate base regulation is unsuited to the setting of rates for independent
producers,252 the Commission was caught in a bind. It responded by
trying to fit the square peg into the round hole and regulating
producers by the rate base method.23 Area pricing is an attempt to
machine a square hole, and in so doing it will be necessary for the
Commission to disregard portions of the Act keyed to rate base
regulation. The Commission may not refuse to exercise some form
of regulation of independent producers; Phillips settled that point.
But should it have stuck to the rate base method and kept up the
losing fight against the backlog of filings, or was it right to go ahead
and shape a new procedural frame for regulation? The answer is not
easily found. It may be thought, however, that in this situation the
administrative body should not be allowed to alter the framework
within which it operates. Decisions as to what interests are to be
protected in ratemaking are politically charged, and should be made
by a legislative body.
In addition to the problem of squaring area pricing with the
Natural Gas Act, constitutional problems are involved in its use.
A producer must be allowed a rate sufficient to enable him to recover
his costs.2- Since costs vary so widely from producer to producer
and, for the small producer especially, are so dependent on luck in
249. "If the rate is set by the 'financial requirements' of the higher cost producer
it will be higher than that necessary to make it just and reasonable to the lower cost
producer, thus resulting in a windfall to the latter. If the 'financial requirements' of the
lower cost producer are used it will result in a rate that will confiscate the gas of the
higher cost producer. If the higher and lower costs are averaged, as the Commission
indicates it intends to do, then the higher cost producer will still not recover his costs
and the rate will be confiscatory. On the other hand the lower cost producer will receive
a windfall." Wisconsin v. FPC, supra note 232, at 328 (dissenting opinion).
250. McKm 15.
251. Thus, the term "just and reasonable"-well defined in utility regulation-was used
without definition in the Natural Gas Act. See note 206 supra.
252. See note 124 supra and accompanying text.
253. See note 139 supra and accompanying text.




exploration,15 there will always be, in each area, a number of pro-
ducers for whom the area price will be confiscatory, unless it is set
at the highest level. As suggested previously, exception could be
made from the general rule in such cases, and prices for these
producers set on an individual basis.256 It would seem, however, that
to make such an exception would seriously hamper the operation of
the Commission. For a mere claim of confiscation would require that
individual producer cost evidence be taken in order to determine
whether or not there was in fact confiscation. And a series of in-
dividual producer hearings at which cost evidence is to be taken was
the very evil the area pricing plan was designed to remove.
C. Responsiveness to the Basic Economic Problem
Economic research has shown that the field market for natural gas
in the United States today is generally competitive, and can be
expected to remain so.ns7 Thus, rate base cost-of-service type regula-
tion makes no sense for this industry; economists and alert legal
commentators have so stated258 What about area pricing?
A competitive market price mechanism will automatically fulfill the
function of allocating a commodity among potential consumers.2s9
When supply, as in the case of natural gas, is relatively fixed, upward
movement of price is the only way to keep demand in equilibrium
with supply.26 The probable effect of area pricing, however, will be
to freeze prices.261 With prices held constant, demand will exceed
supply. And "if for political or social reasons market price is not to
be permitted to rise high enough to bring demand down to the level
of supply, the only solution . . . lies in outright coupon or point
rationing. '"2 62 But ordinary rationing will not work for natural gas.
255. See McKE 7.
256. Note, 75 HAMv. L. REV. 549, 567 (1962).
257. See notes 40 & 72 supra.
258. E.g., FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 648 (1944) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting); ComENBoo passim; MAcAvoY 252-53, 265; McKML 47; Orn, supra note 230.
259. SAmuErLsot-, EcoN-nocs 386 (4th ed. 1958).
260. Id. at 380.
261. MAcAvoY 255. "These guides freeze into permanence the 1959-60 price
levels .... ." Brief for Petitioners State of Wisconsin, Public Service Commission of
Wisconsin, and Public Service Commission of the State of New York, Wisconsin v. FPC,
373 U.S. 294 (1963), p. 17. In its brief the FPC presents statistics purporting to show
that the price rise had in fact been alleviated since area pricing had been initiated.
Brief for Respondent FTC, Wisconsin v. FTC, 373 U.S. 294 (1963), pp. 33-34. "The
fact is that since the Commission's decision in this case the rate of increase in natural
gas prices has fallen off sharply." Id. at 33. It is striking how the Commission here
takes lower prices as an end in itself. The prior steady increase in gas prices, even
under regulation, reflected increasing demand. The area price seems, by the Commis-
sion's admission and intent, to be a price-freezing device.
262. SAm rE sox, op cit. supra note 259, at 395.
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A provision that each consumer may get two-thirds of his annual need
for gas simply will not do. Instead, some consuming areas will have
to be allowed to purchase their requirements of "cheap" gas, while
other potential consuming areas will have to be excluded.263 While
the group receiving the cheap gas profits from the freezing of the
price, the group totally deprived of gas must use alternative fuels,
possibly much more expensive.2a
The demerits of even a systematic program of rationing are readily
apparent. One leading economics text compares rationing with
insanity.265 But there is at present no scheme or system at all for the
rationing of natural gas. Presumably a "first come, first served" basis
would be followed; although this seems hardly an intelligent approach
to the problem.
Another unfortunate aspect of area pricing will be its effect on the
amount of new gas reserves. "In simplest terms, the expectation of
higher future prices provides incentive for larger exploration invest-
ments. Given a priori probability of success in finding dry-gas re-
serves, the larger investment results in larger discovery."266 The
freezing of the price will remove this incentive to exploratory effort.
26 7
Still further, the freezing of prices which will result from use of the
area plan will impede the trend toward systematic competition in
those producing areas previously characterized by monopsony
pricing.
268
The consumer's chief complaint is that the natural gas producer is
making wrongful profits as a result of the tremendous increase in the
demand for natural gas.269 But this is a problem of income distribu-
tion,2 70 and it should not (indeed, cannot) be solved by tinkering with
the market price mechanism. If there is a legitimate complaint about
producers' profits, the proper remedy is taxation.27 1 However, one
may wonder whether consumer groups are really concerned about
undeserved producer profits, or whether, in fact, they are merely
263. MAcAvoY 255-56.
264. Id. at 258.
265. SA uELSON, op cit. supra note 259, at 395.
266. MAcAVoY 259.
267. Id. at 260-61.
268. Id. at 255.
269. See CoamNnoo 103.
270. That is, the complaint logically is not that prices are too high, but that the pro-
ducers are getting more than their fair share of the nation's income by virtue of their
ownership of national energy resources. This problem is better solved by taking the
excessive profits away from the producers. Lindahl, Federal Regulation of Natural Gas
Producers and Gatherers, 46 Am. EcoN. REv. 532, 543 (1956).
271. Ibid. There would be disagreement from those economists who feel that the
burden of a tax falls largely upon the consumer. But economists are not in agreement
as to what is the incidence of a tax. SAmOELsoN, op. cit. supra note 259, at 138.
Samuelson says that "a tax will raise the price to the consumer and will lower the price
received by the producer, the difference going to the government." Id. at 391.
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concerned to continue buying gas at a low price. Along this line it
should be noted that present consumers of natural gas employ
articulate spokesmen to advance their case; the potential consumers
whom a price freeze would exclude have no voice.
D. Conclusion
There are serious operational and legal drawbacks to the use of
area pricing. More important, however, than these is the failure of
area pricing to make good economic sense. In the absence of regula-
tion natural gas prices would be set by a competitive market price
mechanism. There would be no necessity for a rationing program.
Regulation under the area pricing plan seems destined to freeze
prices, and will inevitably lead to some form of rationing. Since
there is no machinery available for the implementation of a systematic
rationing scheme, this rationing will probably be carried out on a
"first come, first served" basis.
Wbile there may be a legitimate complaint that producers are
making windfall profits at the expense of consumers, this is a problem
in income distribution. It is not indicative of any defect in the
market. The income distribution problem should be met by increased
taxation of producers, not by tinkering with the market price
mechanism.
VI. EVALUATION OF THE ABOLITION OF INDEFINITE PICING
Indefinite pricing clauses came into widespread use as a defense
against loss of profits by a producer who, in a rising market, tied up
his gas for a long period of time.272 Some of the clauses that were
developed are completely indefensible on economic grounds. Spiral
and price index clauses work against the free operation of the market
price mechanism. 273 The same is true of third-party favored nation
clauses, which tend to negate the important element of bargaining. 74
Two-party favored nation clauses, on the other hand, may have some
beneficial economic effects.275 However, the buyer relocation that
their use tends to produce is an effective argument against them.
270
Renegotiation clauses, on the other hand, merely serve to reopen
bargaining at some later date. Thus they do not interfere with
competitive price determination. Furthermore, since their use is
already limited in the regulations, renegotiation clauses will not add
appreciably to the regulatory burden of the Commission. (Of course,
272. See notes 25 & 26 supra and accompanying text.
273. See notes 90 & 91 supra and accompanying text.
274. See note 92 supra and accompanying text.
275. See notes 93 & 94 supra and accompanying text.
276. See notes 97 & 98 supra and accompanying text.
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definite price adjustment clauses will add nothing at all, since they
are approved when the original contract is approved.)
The number of rate increase filings caused by the operation of
indefinite pricing clauses is substantial. 277 To ban them as the Com-
mission has done by regulation will relieve its regulatory ills to a
considerable degree. Furthermore, except for renegotiation clauses,
which are permitted, such provisions are not economically desirable.
The legality of the Commission's action has been established.278 And
the courts have indicated that they are not insensitive to the practical
need for such relief.279 It is submitted that, unlike area pricing, the
abolition of indefinite pricing clauses makes practical, legal, and
economic good sense.
VII. SUMMARY AND PROPOSALS
In the early 1960's the Federal Power Commission launched a two-
fold attack on the problem of regulating independent natural gas
producers. One branch of this attack, the abolition of indefinite
pricing clauses, was economically sound, and has been sustained by
the Supreme Court. The other branch, the area pricing plan, has not
been tested by the courts. However, it does not make good economic
sense, and it promises to run into both practical and legal difficulties as
well.
If area pricing is condemned by the courts, the Commission may
feel bound to return to the use of the rate base cost-of-service method,
a public utility regulation technique. Application of the rate base
method to producers makes as little sense as the use of area pricing.
However, the Court has instructed the Commission that it must
exercise some degree of regulatory authority over natural gas pro-
ducers. What, then, is the Commission to do? The answer is not
entirely clear. One alternative would be for Congress to exempt
independent producers from the Natural Gas Act. But reliance
cannot be had upon such a solution.2 0
Another alternative that has been suggested could be adopted by
the Commission on its own initiative. It has been shown that, by and
large, prices are set competitively in the field market for natural gas.
277. See Texaco, Inc., 27 F.P.C. 339, 340 (1962).
278. See notes 221-26 supra and accompanying text.
279. E.g., in the Texaco case the Supreme Court noted the burden placed on the
Commission by the widespread use of indefinite pricing clauses. FPC v. Texaco, Inc.,
32 U.S.L. WEEK 4370, 4373 n.12 (U.S. April 20, 1964).
280. See notes 157-64 supra and accompanying text. However, with a President
from the leading producing state the results of legislative effort might be different. While
he was still a Senator, President Johnson wrote an article denouncing the Phillips de-




Regulation of price281 is unnecessary except in those segments of the
market in which prices are not set competitively. The Commission's
function should be to determine in which segments of the market, if
any, prices are not set competitively. 2  Since market conditions vary
with time, this watchdog role would be a continuing duty of the
Commission.2 3 To determine whether or not pricing in any part of
the market was subject to monopolistic influences, the Commission's
investigatory staff would have recourse to concentration figures,
theoretical pricing models (such as that developed by MacAvoy),
and other economic tools.
In any area in which the Commission determines that prices are
set competitively, the Commission should approve any contract arrived
at through arm's length bargaining. In areas in which pricing is non-
competitive, the Commission should set prices, having recourse to
the prevailing competitive market price.
It will be objected to this proposal that the purpose of the Natural
Gas Act is to underwrite just and reasonable gas rates for consumers.s 4
But, first, an arm's length bargain in a competitive market could
certainly fall under the label "just and reasonable." And, second,
the word "consumers" should be read to mean "the consuming public"
and not merely "those presently buying gas."285 While an artificially
low price will certainly be more desirable to present consumers of
natural gas, it produces rationing. 286 Without rhyme or reason, num-
bers of potential consumers are deprived of gas altogether. Perhaps
a more intelligent scheme of allocating the nation's gas resources than
by use of the market price mechanism can be devised. If so, it should
be considered. But in the absence of such a scheme, resort to the
competitive market would seem to be the most sensible way to resolve
the problem.
CHArmEs E. MCCALLUM*
* Associate, Warner, Norcross & Judd, Grand Rapids, Michigan.
281. To avoid a windfall to producers, regulation of profits may be desirable. See
notes 270-271 supra and accompanying text.
282. McKrn 47. McKie says that to exempt the field price from regulation is political-
ly unfeasible. But, he suggests, the FPC can deal with those special situations where
there are substantial monopolistic influences. And, "there appears to be no decisive
reason why market competition cannot generally regulate the field price of natural gas
in the public interest." Ibid.
283. Compare H.R. 3940, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955), where a similar proposal
was introduced. See note 164 supra for a portion of the text of the bill.
284. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672, 685 (1954).
285. See Lovejoy, Gas Conservation and Public Utility Regulation in Our National
Fuels Policy, 1 NATuRAL RFsourcs J. 257 (1961). The author states: "The 'public'
seems to be only the current gas consuming group, or expectant consumers waiting for
service. Present and potential users of other fuels, gas producers, other fuel producers,
and potential gas customers, present and future, appear to get little or no attention."
Id. at 259.
286. See notes 261-64 supra and accompanying text.
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Scope of Judicial Review
in Urban Renewal Litigation
I. INMODUCnON
A. Background
The problem of urban decay and blight has become increasingly
recognized as a widespread national problem.' The initial federal
legislation 2 aimed at eliminating urban decay authorized capital grants
to local public agencies for the acquisition and clearance of slum
areas which were breeding places for crime and disease and the con-
struction thereon of low rent public housing. The Housing Act of
19493 authorized federal aid to local projects for the acquisition and
clearance of "blighted, deteriorated, or deteriorating" areas and the
redevelopment of such areas by private enterprise to as large a degree
as possible. State enabling acts were passed which authorized the
establishment of local agencies to administer projects and the contri-
bution of matching funds by municipalities. The courts unanimously
upheld the constitutionality of the state slum clearance enabling
statutes as a valid exercise of the police power pursuant to which
public funds might be expended and the power of eminent domain
used.4 The state urban renewal statutes passed pursuant to the
Housing Act of 1949 presented a considerably more difficult prob-
lem since they were not confined to the clearance of slums and
erection of housing, but extended to the condemnation and re-
development of property for commercial and industrial uses. Also
the contemplated use of eminent domain to acquire private prop-
erty for resale to private developers created a problem. The high
courts of three states held that the statutes which authorized the tak-
ing of private property for redevelopment by private developers were
an unconstitutional attempt to use the power of eminent domain for
a private purpose.5 Only one of these decisions still stands,6 although
1. For a discussion of the degree of blight in the United States in 1950, see 1 U.S.
CENsus OF HOUsiNG, pt. 1, pp. xxii, xxiii (1950), and DEWHURST AND AssocxATEs,
AMERICA'S NEEDS AND RESOURCES 221-22 (1955).
2. 50 Stat. 888 (1937), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1401-36 (1958).
3. 63 Stat. 413 (1949), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1441, 1451-60 (1958).
4. See, e.g., City of Cleveland v. United States, 323 U.S. 329 (1945); Allydonn
Realty Corp. v. Holyoke Housing Authority, 304 Mass. 288, 23 N.E.2d 665 (1939);
New York City Housing Authority v. Muller, 270 N.Y. 333, 1 N.E.2d 153 (1936);
Annot., 130 A.L.R. 1069 (1941).
5. Adams v. Housing Authority, 60 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 1952); Housing Authority v.
Johnson, 209 Ga. 560, 74 S.E.2d 891 (1953); Edens v. City of Columbia, 228 S.C.
563, 91 S.E.2d 280 (1956).
6. The Adams case, supra note 5, seems to have been impliedly overruled in Grub-
stein v. Urban Renewal Agency, 115 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 1959), which held urban re-
newal constitutional at least to the extent that it contemplated the elimination of




constitutional amendments were deemed necessary to validate these
statutes in six states prior to any judicial scrutiny.7 The great majority
of the courts held the statutes valid on a theory which stretched
somewhat the traditional concept of public use.8 Public use had been
generally taken to mean the future use by the public of the property
acquired.9 The courts reasoned that the acquisition itself was a public
purpose since the acquisition and clearance eliminated slums and
blight and that the intended future use by private developers was
merely incidental to the achievement of that public purpose. The Su-
preme Court of the United States upheld the validity of the District
of Columbia's enabling act in an opinion which indicated that eco-
nomic re-development alone is a public use under the United States
Constitution. 10 Whatever may have been the merits of these constitu-
tional objections to the statutes on their faces, they have been put at
rest. There remains largely unsettled, however, the problem of the
scope of judicial limitations, constitutional or otherwise, on the ad-
ministration of these acts.
B. Outline of Administrative Procedure
The typical urban renewal project" is initiated by the local public
agency which prepares a project plan' 2 after a study of the selected
area. The plan will include maps classifying existing structures in the
area as standard or substandard and designating which of the parcels
should be acquired. The plan will also contain maps setting out the
proposed re-use of the property to be acquired. The proposed project
7. CAL. CoNsT. art. XIII, § 19; GA. CONST. art. XVI; MD. CONST. art XI-B; Mo.
CONST. art. VI, § 21; N.J. CONST. art 8, § 3; N.Y. CONST. art. 18, §§ 1,2.
8. See, e.g., Schneider v. District of Columbia, 117 F. Supp. 705 (D.D.C. 1953),
aff'd sub nom., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Grubstein v. Urban Renewal
Agency, supra note 6; Zurn v. City of Chicago, 389 Il. 114, 59 N.E.2d 18 (1945);
Crommett v. City of Portland, 150 Me. 217, 107 A.2d 841 (1954); Murray v. La
Guardia, 291 N.Y. 320, 52 N.E.2d 884 (1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 771 (1944).
See also cases cited in Annot., 44 A.L.R.2d 1414 (1955), and Miller v. City of Tacoma,
61 Wash. 2d 374, 394 n.6, 378 P.2d 464, 476 n.6 (1963).
9. Schneider v. District of Columbia, supra note 8, at 716, discusses this evolution
of the public use concept.
10. Berman v. Parker, supra note 8, affirming sub nom. Schneider v. District of Co-
lumbia, supra note 8. The court said, "It is within the power of the legislature to
determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well
as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled. In the present case, the Congress
and its authorized agencies have made determinations that take into account a wide
variety of values. It is not for us to reappraise them. If those who govern the District
of Columbia decide that the Nation's Capital should be beautiful as well as sanitary,
there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the way." 348 U.S. at 33.
11. 63 Stat. 420 (1949), 42 U.S.C. § 1460(c) (1958).
12. 63 Stat. 420 (1949), 42 U.S.C. § 1455(a) (1958). For the elements of a plan,
see HHFA, LocAL PuBLic AGENcY MANUAL Pt. 2, ch. 5, § 2 (1955).
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must be approved by the governing body of the municipality 13 and
there must be a public hearing on the merits of the proposal.14 If
approved, the local agency submits the plan to the Federal Urban
Renewal Administrator along with an application for a capital grant
and loan. The capital grant usually comprises two-thirds of the total
project cost except in cases where neither the existing use nor the
proposed re-use is predominantly residential.'5 The only administra-
tive remedy available to a dissatisfied property owner or citizen is
the right to be heard at the public hearing.
II. AREAS OF JUDICIAL CONTROL
A. Character of the Project Area
The most frequent objection which has been raised in the courts
as to the validity of a project is that the project area is not in fact
"blighted, deteriorated, or deteriorating" within the meaning of the
statute.16 There are considerably divergent views both as to the mean-
ing of "blight" and as to the extent to which the administrative decla-
ration of blight shall be conclusive on the courts. The differing inter-
pretations of "blight" are primarily due to the lack of a clear, or in
some cases any, definition of the term in most enabling acts. Most
state courts have construed this term as denoting an area which is
detrimental to the health, safety, morals, or welfare of the community,
i.e., an area which differs only in degree from a slum.17 But in Ber-
man v. Parker,' the Supreme Court indicated that a blighted area
could be an area which, in the opinion of the administrators, is an
economic or aesthetic detriment to the community. Apparently no
state court has defined the term this broadly.
Decisions as to the conclusiveness of the administrative finding of
blight range all the way from an apparent holding that judicial re-
13. 63 Stat. 416 (1949), 42 U.S.C. § 1455(a) (1958).
14. 63 Stat. 416 (1949), 42 U.S.C. § 1455(d) (1958).
15. 63 Stat. 414 (1949), 42 U.S.C. § 1452(a) (1958). It is provided in 63 Stat.
420 (1949), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1460(c) (Supp. IV, 1962), that if a project
area is neither at present "clearly predominantly residential' nor will be redeveloped
for predominantly residential uses under the plan, then the capital grant cannot exceed
30% of the maximum grant allowable under § 1452(a).
16. The statute provides: "'Urban renewal area' means a slum area or a blighted,
deteriorated, or deteriorating area in the locality involved which the Administrator
approves as appropriate for an urban renewal project." These terms are nowhere de-
fined in the federal act. The term "blight" is frequently used to include "blighted,
deteriorated, or deteriorating conditions" and shall be so used hereinafter. 63 Stat. 420
(1949), 42 U.S.C. § 1460(a) (1958).
17. See, e.g., Crommett v. City of Portland, supra note 8; Murray v. LaGuardia,
supra note 8.
18. Supra note 8.
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view should be de novo19 to one that the findings are conclusive.2
Most courts have characterized these findings as legislative in nature
and thus entitled to considerable weight.21 These courts have fre-
quently stated the test to be that if the evidence is such that men
of training and experience might differ, then the court will not sub-
stitute its judgement for that of the local agency.22 It is frequently
said that the findings of the local agency must be arbitrary, unreasona-
ble, or in bad faith before they will be set aside.23 A few courts have
held that the only evidence which may be considered is that which
was before the agency at the public hearing and that in order to be
reversed the findings must appear unreasonable or arbitrary on the
basis of this evidence.2' However, the prevailing view seems to be
that all relevant evidence is admissable25 and that if, on the basis of
this evidence, it appears that men of training and experience might
19. Bristol Redevelopment and Housing Authority v. Denton, 198 Va. 171, 93 S.E.2d
288 (1956). The court reasoned as follows: "Thus, the condition of an area is the
very basis of the jurisdiction and power of a redevelopment authority to acquire
property located therein by eminent domain. Code, § 36-50. Unless the area meets
this definition the authority has no power to acquire it and the council has no basis
for the approval of such taking. In this situation, the court has the right to determine
whether the area is in fact 'blighted or deteriorated' as defined in the statute. Code,
§ 36-49(1)." Id. at 178, 93 S.E.2d at 293.
20. Allen v. City Council, 215 Ga. 778, 113 S.E.2d 621 (1960). The Georgia court
had originally held the enabling act unconstitutional, but the decision was overruled
by a constitutional amendment. The court indicated that the amendment had com-
pletely withdrawn from the court the power to review saying, "however much as
individuals we may deplore the surrender by the people of their rights, as Justices of
this Court we unhesitatingly follow and apply the law as the people have written it."
Id. at 782, 113 S.E.2d at 624.
21. E.g., Bahr Corp. v. O'Brion, 146 Conn. 237, 149 A.2d 691 (1959); City of
Chicago v. R. Zwick Co., 27 Ill. 2d 128, 188 N.E.2d 489 (1963); Bowker v. City of
Worcester, 334 Mass. 422, 136 N.E.2d 208 (1956); Miller v. City of Tacoma, supra
note 8.
22. See Kaskel v. Impellitteri, 306 N.Y. 73, 115 N.E.2d 659 (1953), cert. denied,
347 U.S. 934 (1954); Boro Hall Corp. v. Impellitteri, 128 N.Y.S.2d 804, aff'd, 283
App. Div. 889, 130 N.Y.S.2d 6, motion for rehearing denied, 283 App. Div. 951, 130
N.Y.S.2d 887, appeal denied, 307 N.Y. 672, 120 N.E.2d 847 (1954). In the Boro Hall
case, the court said: "Nothing has been presented to this court which would do more
than indicate that perhaps men of training and experience might honestly differ on
this question. In such cases the Legislature has undoubtedly given the local authorities
power to make that determination." 128 N.Y.S.2d at 806. The court also said that
the exclusion of several parcels logically included does not run afoul of the "area as
a whole" concept.
23. State ex rel. Dalton v. Land Clearance for Redevelopment Authority, 364 Mo.
974, 270 S.W.2d 44 (1954); Kaskel v. Impellitteri, supra note 22; Miller v. City of
Tacoma, supra note 8.
24. Bowker v. City of Worcester, supra note 21; Urban Renewal Agency v.
Iacometti, 379 P.2d 466 (Nev. 1963).
25. In re Bunker Hill Urban Renewal Project IB, 37 Cal. Rptr. 74, 389 P.2d 538
(1964) (evidence of prior findings by city health department held admissible);
Bahr Corp. v. O'Brion, supra note 21; Offen v. City of Topeka, 186 Kan. 389, 350
P.2d 33 (1960); Bristol Redevelopment and Housing Authority v. Denton, supra note
19. The Bahr case is discussed in Note, 69 YALE L.J. 321 (1959).
reasonably characterize the area as blighted, then the administrative
determination will not be disturbed.
The courts have generally been quite reluctant to set aside an urban
renewal project on this basis. In only one reported case has a court
set aside a project solely on the basis that it did not meet the statutory
requirement concerning the character of the area.2 The courts have
generally been reluctant to substitute their judgement for the objective
judgement of a group of city planning experts to whom this function
has been delegated by the legislature. In addition to this, it is fre-
quently said that the required public hearing affords each property
owner an adequate administrative remedy. However, the position that
there should be stricter review is not without foundation. The nature
of the urban renewal structure makes it very difficult in many cases for
the local public agency to make entirely objective determinations.
The existence and continued operation of a local agency depends upon
findings that conditions of slum and blight exist in the community.
The adoption of each project means another sizable federal grant to
a municipality. Frequently, there is strong public sentiment for or
against a particular project due to the proposed re-use of the property.
All of these outside pressures may affect the objectivity of the local
agency from the time the study of an area is begun. 7 In addition
to these outside pressures, there is usually a large expenditure of time
and money on the part of the local agency in the study of an area
and the preparation of a plan. Consequently, by the time the public
hearing is held, in many cases the members of the local agency are
committed to the adoption of the plan.28 In fact, it would be strange
indeed if the architects of a plan should not take pride in it and
advocate its ratification. A court of law is more immune to these
factors which militate against objectivity.
B. Real Purpose of the Project
Another objection which has frequently been raised before the
courts is that the real purpose2 9 for undertaking a particular project
26. Bristol Redevelopment and Housing Authority v. Denton, supra note 19. The
court heard testimony as to the character of each piece of property in the entire
project area and determined that substandard structures comprised less than 50%
of the total structures in the project area. In Bahr Corp. v. O'Brion, supra note 21,
and in Offen v. City of Topeka, supra note 25, allegations in the pleadings were held
sufficient to show determinations of blight were unreasonable and arbitrary in the
respective areas involved.
27. For a discussion of the various pressure groups usually interested in urban
renewal programs, see Johnstone, The Federal Urban Renewal Program, 25 U. Cm.
L. R-v. 301, 313-15 (1958).
28. For a discussion of local agency determination prior to the public hearing, see
Note, supra note 25, at 328. See also Sullivan, Administrative Procedure and the
Advocatory Process in Urban Redevelopment, 45 CALw. L. Rv. 134, 144 (1957).
29. It is not clear from the cases which consider "real purpose" whether the
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is either private or ultra vires. In order to determine the scope of this
limitation, it is first necessary to determine the purpose or purposes
of the urban renewal statutes. In considering the constitutionality of
the enabling acts most courts found it necessary to determine the
statuatory purposes; however these decisions are not entirely in
harmony. Since statutes are given a constitutional meaning whenever
possible, it is likely that the determinations of statutory purpose were
influenced by each court's effort to give the enabling act a constitu-
tional meaning. As pointed out above, most of the courts held that
the primary purpose of the statutes is the elimination of blight, not
redevelopment.30 There are at least two other minority views. In
Berman v. Parker,3 1 the District of Columbia enabling act was inter-
preted to have the dual purpose of blight elimination and economic
redevelopment, neither of which was considered dominant. Another
interpretation has been that the elimination of blight is the primary
purpose, but that redevelopment so as to prevent their recurrence is
a continuing part of that purpose.
32
The subject of this section is the extent to which the courts will
consider an allegation that the real or dominant purposes is not in
fact the elimination of slums or blight, but some other purpose,
whether public or private. This objection may be upon either of two
bases. First and most frequent is that the real purpose is a private
one and it is unconstitutional to spend tax money or to use the power
of eminent domain for a private purpose. Second, a project may
be attacked on the theory that the real purpose is some purpose
other than the statuatory purpose of elimination of slums or blight
and thus is ultra vires. This second objection would be valid even
where the real purpose was a public purpose. There is authority for
both of these approaches. These decisions are not based upon allega-
tions of an evil or corrupt purpose, but upon the theory that there
has been an honest misconception of the proper purpose or function
of urban renewal on the part of a local agency. In Re Opinion of
the Justice, 33 is a leading decision on real purpose being an uncon-
stitutional one, though it is not an urban renewal case. The legislature
of Massachusetts had declared an area occupied by an old railroad
yard to be blighted and subject to redevelopment. It appeared that
the land was so situated as to be ideally suited for economic re-
actual subjective intent of members of a local agency is relevant or whether the
improper motivating purpose must be shown only by evidence of objective circum-
stances showing that an undertaking will not reasonably accomplish a proper purpose.
30. It is not clear from these cases whether redevelopment is an incidental purpose
of the statute or merely a power incidental to, but necessary to carry out, the
statuatory purpose.
31. Supra note 8.
32. Velishka v. City of Nashua, 99 N.H. 161, 106 A.2d 571 (1954).
33. 332 Mass. 769, 126 N.E.2d 795 (1955).
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development. The court looked behind the legislative declaration of
blight and concluded that the "primary design" of the project was
redevelopment and not the elimination of blight.3 The court looked
at all the circumstances including the present character of the area
as compared with other areas in the city of Boston and the proposed
re-use and determined that this area would not have been selected
had it not been so attractive for redevelopment.35 Decisions from
other jurisdictions 'which do not consider redevelopment a public
purpose seem to be in accord with the Massachusetts court.36
The constitutional objection would not pertain where the real
purpose was not the elimination of blight, but was some other public
purpose such as the acquisition of land for a public hospital or school.
In such a case, the problem would be whether such a purpose was
ultra vires. The view that any motivating purpose other than the
elimination of blight is ultra vires is very clearly set out in Kasket v.
Impellitteri.37 This theory appeared in a strong dissenting opinion
with which the majority agreed to the extent of the ,applicable rules
of law. In the Kaskel case, the urban renewal plan contemplated the
re-use of the property acquired for a municipal stadium, a public
purpose. The rule was laid down that if the real purpose was other
than the elimination of blight, then such purpose is ultra vires ir-
respective of how commendable it may be.38 The majority of the
court concluded from all the evidence that the declared purpose, i.e.,
the elimination of blight, was the real reason for undertaking the
project.
34. The court concluded: "It seems plain that the primary design of the bill is
to provide for the acquisition of the area by the use, at the outset at least, of sub-
stantial sums of public money and later of comparatively small sums, to formulate
a plan for development, including the devoting of some portions of the area to
truly public uses, and the return of the remainder to private ownership to be
rented or sold for private profit, with the expectation that adjacent areas and the
city as a whole will benefit through the increase of taxable property and of values.
But this kind of indirect public benefit has never been deemed to render a project
one for a public purpose." Id. at 783, 126 N.E.2d at 803.
35. The court stated, "the main difference between the area we are now considering
and such other tracts seems to be that the location of this tract makes it more
prominent than many others, and this is hardly a difference in principle." Ibid.
36. See, e.g., City of San Francisco v. Ross, 44 Cal. 2d 52, 279 P.2d 529 (1955);
Denihan Enterprises v. O'Dwyer, 302 N.Y. 451, 99 N.E.2d 235 (1951); Hogue v.
Port of Seattle, 54 Wash. 2d 799, 341 P.2d 171 (1959).
37. Supra note 22.
38. The court expressed the rule as follows: "If the main purpose of combining
these two areas is not slum clearance, but merely to lend color to the acquisition
of land for a coliseum under the guise of a slum clearance project, then the com-
bined project is not authorized by statute, and a taxpayer's action can be maintained
to restrain it under section 51 of the General Municipal Law, Denihan Enterprises v.
O'Dwyer, 302 N.Y. 451, 99 N.E.2d 235. In that event, the courts would not be
invading the administrative province, but performing their duty in limiting adminis-
trative officials, capable and public spirited as they may be, to spending public money
for purposes authorized by law." Id. at 83, 115 N.E.2d at 664.
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There is no clear holding that a project may be invalidated even
where it is not unreasonable to characterize the area as blighted be-
cause it appears that the real purpose is unconstitutional or ultra
vires. In the cases where it has been found that the primary purpose
was improper, there has also been some question as to the character
of the area. The character of the area is always evidence of the real
purpose. Theoretically it would not seem to make any difference
whether the area is in fact blighted when the issue of motivating
purpose is being considered. But a questionable determination of
blight would always be a circumstance to consider in determining real
purpose. An incidental proper purpose should not validate a project
where the dominating purpose is improper.
C. Particular Parcels within the Area
Another related problem is the selection of the area boundaries and
the parcels to be acquired. Property owners have frequently ob-
jected to the taking of their property on the theory that their par-
ticular property is not substandard. This objection has been
unanimously rejected under the "area as a whole" doctrine.39 The
courts reason that the purpose of the statute is to eliminate sub-
standard conditions in an entire area and that certain properties
inoffensive in themselves may be taken in order to redevelop the
area as a whole in such a manner as to prevent the recurrence of
blight. It is a common practice for the local agency not to acquire
certain standard parcels which are considered in determining the
character of the project area but which are not considered necessary
for the renewal of the area as a whole. Certain other properties logi-
cally within the project area are neither taken nor even included in
computing the percentage of substandard structures in the area.40 It is
not clear whether this type of "administrative gerrymandering" is
proper. This practice has been assailed in only one reported case in
which it was held that the exclusion of a few such parcels did not
invalidate the project under the "area as a whole" concept. 41 It
would seem that if carried to an extreme, entire cities could be
classified as blighted and subject to piecemeal renewal in violation of
the "area as a whole" concept.
39. See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, supra note 8; Gohld Realty Co. v. City of Hartford,
141 Conn. 135, 104 A.2d 365 (1954). Cases are collected in Annot., 44 A.L.R.2d
1414, 1439 (1955).
40. These practices are suggested by the Federal Administrator. See the suggested
redevelopment plan, supra note 12.
41. Boro Hall Corp. v. Impellitteri, supra note 22. The court implied that the
exclusion of a large number of parcels might require a different result.
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IV. CONCLUSION AND PROPOSALS
Though it may be said that there is some meaningful judicial re-
view in the area of urban renewal, so far the courts have been
reluctant to set aside a project except in extreme cases. It is under-
standable that the courts are hesitant to enter this area of adminis-
trative judgement in which courts do not profess to be experts. Such
interference could certainly cause very costly delay in the execution
of proposed projects and would place an added burden on the already
crowded dockets. This attitude could not be critized if there were
clear and meaningful statutory standards to guide and restrain the
local agencies coupled with a reasonable administrative remedy for
the correction of errors in administration.
There are indications that in many instances the local agencies have
misconceived what is the real purpose of the urban renewal laws.
Sometimes the emphasis seems to be on the re-planning and re-
development of cities rather than the elimination of evils which
already exist in the cities. There are several cases on record where
local agencies have contracted to sell land to private persons prior
to the public hearing or the official approval of the plan. There has
been widespread lay criticism of urban renewal as being merely a
guise to receive federal grants for private economic development.43
According to a great majority of the courts, it is not the purpose of
the enabling acts to acquire land for needed economic development
and if it were, the acts would be unconstitutional.
The federal act requires that the local agencies prepare a "worka-
ble program" before undertaking urban renewal in a community,4
and this requirement has been incorporated into the state enabling
acts. This requirement may have been considered by Congress as
being roughly comparable to the comprehensive plan requirement
of zoning law. In practice, however, it has never been considered
more than a condition precedent to a federal grant and has never
been strictly enforced by the Federal Urban Renewal Administrator.45
Nor has it ever been used by a court as a basis for review.
If an analogy may be made to zoning law, which is somewhat
similar in nature to urban renewal, it will be seen that the scope
of review in urban renewal is considerably narrower. As in zoning,
42. Kintzele v. City of St. Louis, 347 S.W.2d 695 (Mo. 1961); Bleecker Luncheon-
ette v. Wagner, 141 N.Y.S.2d 293, aft'd, 143 N.Y.S.2d 628 (1955). In the Bleecker
case, New York University had also defrayed part of the cost of the study of the
project area.
43. See Dowdy, The Mounting Scandal of Urban Renewal, Reader's Digest, March
1964, p.5 1.
44. 63 Stat. 414 (1949), 42 U.S.C. § 1451(c) (1958).
45. See Johnstone, supra note 27, for a discussion of the requirements of a workable
program and the leniency with which the Administrator approves them.
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there is the constitutional limitation that the action of the authorities
must not be unreasonable or arbitrary. This constitutional limitation
is applied only in extreme cases of abuse of discretion. Also like
zoning, an urban renewal project must be in pursuance of a proper
purpose. The third major restraint in zoning law, that zoning must
be "in accordance with a comprehensive plan,"46 has no workable
counterpart in the urban renewal laws.
There have been some very commendable efforts at self-restraint
by the Federal Administrator. In a recent directive to the local
agencies, it was made a prerequisite to the receipt of future federal
grants that the local agencies formulate a sort of master plan for
urban renewal in a particular city.47 This plan would show all the
slums and blighted areas throughout a city. It would designate the
priorities of all areas in the renewal scheme presumably based on the
degree of blight. It remains to be seen to what extent the Federal
Administrator will enforce this requirement. Urban renewal is an
area where a master plan requirement could be very valuable.4  The
comprehensive plan requirement of zoning law which has been an
effective deterrent in many cases to arbitrary or "spot" zoning would
probably not be nearly so effective in urban renewal. Unlike urban
renewal, zoning is by nature city wide and comprehensive so that a
general plan can frequently be discerned by the courts. It is much
more difficult to discern a general scheme in the scattered urban
renewal projects in a city. But a master plan showing all blighted
areas throughout a city and showing degrees of blight in each area
would show a general scheme in the light of which a particular
proposed project could be judged. This would largely eliminate the
danger of blight being used as an excuse for the acquisition and
redevelopment of property rather than the cause for such acquisition
and redevelopment. The system of priorities would largely prevent
the ad hoc development of areas due to the desirability of the location
for redevelopment. The cost of urban renewal also dictates such a
course. The project area which was held properly classified blighted
in Kaskel v. Impellitteri,49 was similar in character to one-third of
46. Courts reviewing zoning matters have frequently employed this statuatory
language to test the propriety of actions of zoning authorities. However, it has been
argued that this statuatory standard adds nothing to the constitutional standard and
that courts would reach the same result applying only the constitutional restraint
on unreasonable or arbitrary action. See Haar, In Accordance With a Comprehensive
Plan, 68 HI- v. L. RiEv. 1154 (1955).
47. HHFA, Local Public Agency Letter No. 276, Aug. 19, 1963.
48. For a definition of a master plan and a criticism of its merits with relation
to zoning, see Haar, The Master Plan: An Impermanent Constitution, 20 LAw &
CoarmT. PROB. 353 (1955). According to Haar, one of the major effects of a
master plan is to minimize arbitrary zoning in a community. Id. at 367.
49. Supra note 22.
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the area of New York City. The cost of urban renewal in New York
has averaged 481,000 dollars per acre.50 Due to this prohibitive cost,
urban renewal of necessity must proceed very slowly and it seems
only logical that the worst areas of blight should be eliminated first.
If a master plan requirement were incorporated into the state enabl-
ing acts so as to be readily available as an effective judicial restraint,
it would go a long way toward eliminating the danger of misconcep-
tion of purpose which exists under the present law.
In addition to a master plan requirement, it would be desirable to
provide an administrative remedy before an independent forum with
no stake in the ratification of a project plan. This forum should be
divorced as far as possible from political influence and should be in
no way connected with the local administrative agencies. This forum
would bear some similarity to planning commissions and should be
composed of men possessing some degree of expertise in city planning.
This would relieve the courts of some of the burden of reviewing
urban renewal projects and would afford a hearing before an objective
board of experts. Until such meaningful statutory restraints and
remedies are provided, it is essential that the courts guard individual
rights against abuse by the ever growing urban renewal movement.
It cannot be denied that urban renewal has performed a valuable
and needed function in the elimination of ever-increasing areas of
blight in American cities. The courts must be careful not to unduly
hamper the proper operation of this vital program. But the sanctity
of private property is equally as valuable and must not be sacrificed
in the process simply because it is more convenient to the administra-
tion of the program.
JOEL PORTER
50. H.R. REP. No. 7, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1961).
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